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POLYNOMIAL TIME ATTACK ON WILD MCELIECE OVER
QUADRATIC EXTENSIONS
ALAIN COUVREUR, AYOUB OTMANI, AND JEAN–PIERRE TILLICH
Abstract. We present a polynomial-time structural attack against the McEliece system
based on Wild Goppa codes defined over a quadratic finite field extension. We show that
such codes can be efficiently distinguished from random codes. The attack uses this property
to compute a filtration, that is to say, a family of nested subcodes which will reveal their
secret algebraic description.
Key words: Public key cryptography, cryptanalysis, McEliece, distinguisher, Schur product,
Goppa codes, generalized Reed Solomon codes, alternant codes, filtration attack.
1. Introduction
The McEliece cryptosystem and its security. The McEliece encryption scheme [McE78]
which dates back to the end of the seventies still belongs to the very few public-key cryp-
tosystems which remain unbroken. It is based on the famous Goppa codes family. Several
proposals which suggested to replace binary Goppa codes with alternative families did not
meet a similar fate. They all focus on a specific class of codes equipped with a decoding al-
gorithm: generalized Reed–Solomon codes (GRS for short) [Nie86] or large subcodes of them
[BL05], Reed–Muller codes [Sid94], algebraic geometry codes [JM96], LDPC and MDPC codes
[BBC08, MTSB13] or convolutional codes [LJ12, GSJB14]. Most of them were successfully
cryptanalyzed [SS92, Wie10, MS07, FM08, OTD10, CGG+14, LT13, CMCP14b, COTG15].
Each time a description of the underlying code suitable for decoding is efficiently obtained.
But some of them remain unbroken, namely those relying on MDPC codes [MTSB13] and their
cousins [BBC08], the original binary Goppa codes of [McE78] and their non-binary variants
as proposed in [BLP10, BLP11].
Concerning the security of the McEliece proposal based on Goppa codes, weak keys were
identified in [Gib91, LS01] but they can be easily avoided. There also exist message recov-
ery attacks using generic exponential time decoding algorithms [LB88, Leo88, Ste88, CC98,
BLP08, MMT11, BJMM12]. More recently, it was shown in [FOPT10, GUL09] that the secret
structure of Goppa codes can be recovered by an algebraic attack using Gröbner bases. This
attack is of exponential nature and is infeasible for the original McEliece scheme (the number
of unknowns is linear in the length of the code), whereas for variants using Goppa codes with a
quasi-dyadic or quasi-cyclic structure it was feasible due to the huge reduction of the number
of unknowns.
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Distinguisher for Goppa and Reed-Solomon codes. None of the existing strategies is
able to severely dent the security of [McE78] when appropriate parameters are taken. Conse-
quently, it has even been advocated that the generator matrix of a Goppa code does not dis-
close any visible structure that an attacker could exploit. This is strengthened by the fact that
Goppa codes share many characteristics with random codes. However, in [FGO+11, FGO+13],
an algorithm that manages to distinguish between a random code and a high rate Goppa code
has been introduced.
Component wise products of codes. [MCP12] showed that the distinguisher given in
[FGO+11] has an equivalent but simpler description in terms of component-wise product of
codes. This product allows in particular to define the square of a code. This square code
operation can be used to distinguish a high rate Goppa code from a random one because
the dimension of the square of the dual is much smaller than the one obtained with a ran-
dom code. The notion of component-wise product of codes was first put forward to unify
many different algebraic decoding algorithms [Pel92, Köt92], then exploited in cryptology in
[Wie10] to break a McEliece variant based on random subcodes of GRS codes [BL05] and in
[MCMMP11, MCMMP14, CMCP14b, CMCP14a] to study the security of encryption schemes
using algebraic geometry codes. Component-wise powers of codes are also studied in the
context of secret sharing and secure multi-party computation [CCCX09, CCX11].
Filtration key-recovery attacks. The works [FGO+11, FGO+13], without undermining
the security of [McE78], prompts to wonder whether it would be possible to devise an attack
exploiting the distinguisher. That was indeed the case in [CGG+14] for McEliece-like public-
key encryption schemes relying on modified GRS codes [BL11, BBC+11, Wie06]. Additionally,
[CGG+14] has shown that the unusually low dimension of the square code of a generalized
GRS code enables to compute a filtration, that is a nested sequence of subcodes, allowing the
recovery of its algebraic structure. This gives an attack that is radically different from the
Sidelnikov-Shestakov approach [SS92]. Notice that the first step of the Sidelnikov-Shestakov
attack which consists in computing the minimal codewords and then using this information
for recovering the algebraic structure has been fruitful for breaking other families of codes:
for instance binary Reed-Muller codes [MS07] or low-genus algebraic geometry codes [FM08].
This is not the approach we have followed here, because finding such codewords seems out
of reach for the codes we are interested in, namely Goppa codes. Our filtration attack is
really a new paradigm for breaking public key cryptosystems based on algebraic codes which
in particular avoids the possibly very expensive computation of minimum weight codewords.
Our contribution. The purpose of this article is to show that the filtration attack of [CGG+14]
which gave a new way of attacking a McEliece scheme based on GRS codes can be generalized
to other families of codes. Notice that this filtration approach was also followed later on with
great success to break all schemes based on algebraic geometry codes [CMCP14b], whereas
the aforementioned attack of Faure and Minder [FM08] could handle only the case of very
low genus curves, due precisely to the expensive computation of the minimal codewords. A
tantalizing project would be to attack Goppa code based McEliece schemes, or more generally
alternant code based schemes. The latter family of codes are subfield subcodes defined over
some field Fq of GRS codes defined over a field extension Fqm . Even for the smallest possible
field extension, that is for m = 2, the cryptanalysis of alternant codes is a completely open
question. Codes of this kind have indeed been proposed as possible improvements of the origi-
nal McEliece scheme, under the form of wild Goppa codes in [BLP10]. These are Goppa codes
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associated to polynomials of the form γq−1 where γ is irreducible. Notice that all irreducible
binary Goppa codes of the original McEliece system are actually wild Goppa codes. Interest-
ingly enough, it turns out that these wild Goppa codes for m = 2 can be distinguished from
random codes for a very large range of parameters by observing that the square code of some
of their shortenings have a small dimension compared to squares of random codes of the same
dimension. It should be pointed out that in the propositions of [BLP10], the case m = 2 was
particularly attractive since it provided the smallest key sizes.
We show here that this distinguishing property can be used to compute an interesting
filtration of the public code, that is to say a family of nested subcodes of the public Goppa
code such that each element of the family is an alternant code with the same support. This
filtration can in turn be used to recover the algebraic description of the Goppa code as an
alternant code, which yields an efficient key recovery attack. This attack has been implemented
in Magma [BCP97] and allowed to break completely all the schemes with a claimed 128 bit
security in Table 7.1 of [BLP10] corresponding to m = 2 when the degree of γ is larger than
3. This corresponds precisely to the case where these codes can be distinguished from random
codes by square code considerations. The filtration attack has a polynomial time complexity
and basically boils down to linear algebra. This is the first time in the 35 years of existence
of the McEliece scheme based on Goppa codes that a polynomial time attack has been found
on it. It questions the common belief that GRS codes are weak for a cryptographic use while
Goppa codes are secure as soon as m > 2 and that for the latter, only generic information-set-
decoding attacks apply. It also raises the issue whether this algebraic distinguisher of Goppa
and more generally alternant codes (see [FGO+13]) based on square code considerations can
be turned into an attack in the other cases where it applies (for instance for Goppa codes of
rate close enough to 1). Finally, it is worth pointing out that our attack works against codes
without external symmetries confirming that the mere appearance of randomness is far from
being enough to defend codes against algebraic attacks.
It should also be pointed out that subsequently to this work, it has been shown in [FPdP14]
that one of the parameters of [BLP10] that we have broken here can be attacked by Gröbner
basis techniques by introducing an improvement of the algebraic modelling of [FOPT10] to-
gether with a new way of exploiting non-prime fields Fq. Unlike our attack, it also applies to
field extensions that are larger than 2 and to variations of the wild Goppa codes, called “wild
Goppa incognito” in [BLP11]. However this new attack is exponential in nature and can be
thwarted by using either more conservative parameters or prime fields Fq. Our attack on the
other hand is much harder to avoid due to its polynomial complexity and choosing m = 2
together with wild Goppa codes seems now something that has to be considered with great
care in a McEliece cryptosystem after our work.
Outline of the article. Our objective is to provide a self-contained article which could be
read by cryptographers who are not aware with coding theory. For this reason, notation
and many classical prerequisites are given in Section 2. The core of our attack is presented
in Sections 3 and 4. Section 3 presents a distinguisher on the public key i.e. a manner to
distinguish such codes from random ones and Section 4 uses this distinguisher to compute a
family of nested subcodes of the public key providing information on the secret key. Section 5
is devoted to a short overview of the last part of the attack. Further technical details on the
attack are given in Appendix C. Section 6 is devoted to the limits and possible extensions of
this attack and Section 7 discusses the theoretical complexity of our algorithm and presents
several running times of our Magma implementation of the attack.
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Note. The material of this article was presented at the conference EUROCRYPT 2014 (Copen-
hagen, Denmark) and published in its proceedings [COT14b]. Due to space constraints, most
of the proofs were omitted in the proceedings version. The present article is a long revisited
version including all the missing proofs. Any proof which we did not consider as fundamental
has been sent to the appendices. We encourage the reader first to read the article without
these proofs and then read the appendices.
2. Notation, Definitions and Prerequisites
We introduce in this section notation we will use in the sequel. We assume that the reader
is familiar with notions from coding theory. We refer to [MS86] for the terminology.
2.1. Vectors, matrices and Schur product. Vectors and matrices are respectively denoted
in bold letters and bold capital letters such as a and A. We always denote the entries of a
vector u ∈ Fnq by u0, . . . , un−1. Given a subset I ⊂ {0, . . . , n−1}, we denote by uI the vector
u punctured at I , that is to say, every entry with index in I is removed. When I = {j} we
allow ourselves to write uj instead of u{j}. The component-wise product also called the Schur
product u ⋆ v of two vectors u,v ∈ Fnq is defined as:
u ⋆ v
def
= (u0v0, . . . , un−1vn−1).
The i–th power u ⋆ · · · ⋆ u is denoted by ui. When every entry ui of u is nonzero, we set
u−1
def
= (u−10 , . . . , u
−1
n−1),
and more generally for all i, we define u−i in the same manner. The operation ⋆ has an
identity element, which is nothing but the all-ones vector (1, . . . , 1) denoted by 1.
2.2. Polynomials. The ring of polynomials with coefficients in Fq is denoted by Fq[z], while
the subspace of Fq[z] of polynomials of degree less than t is denoted by Fq[z]<t. For every
rational fraction P ∈ Fq(z), with no poles at the elements u0, . . . , un−1, P (u) stands for
(P (u0), . . . , P (un−1)). In particular for all a, b ∈ Fq, au+b is the vector (au0+b, . . . , aun−1+b).
The norm and trace from Fqm to Fq can be viewed as polynomials and applied componen-
twise to vectors in Fnqm . In the present article we focus in particular on quadratic extensions
(m = 2) which motivates the following notation for all x ∈ Fnq2 :
N(x)
def
=
(
xq+10 , . . . , x
q+1
n−1
)
, Tr(x)
def
=
(
xq0 + x0, . . . , x
q
n−1 + xn−1
)
.
Finally, to each vector x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Fnq , we associate its locator polynomial denoted
as πx and defined as:
πx(z)
def
=
n−1∏
i=0
(z − xi).
2.3. Operations on codes. For a given code D ⊆ Fnq and a subset I ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1} the
punctured code PI (D) and shortened code SI (D) are defined as:
PI (D) def=
{
(ci)i/∈I | c ∈ D
}
;
SI (D) def=
{
(ci)i/∈I | ∃c = (ci)i ∈ D such that ∀i ∈ I, ci = 0
}
.
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Instead of writing P{j} (D) and S{j} (D) when I = {j} we rather use the notation Pj (D) and
Sj (D). The following classical result will be used repeatedly.
Proposition 1. Let A ⊆ Fnq be a code and I ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1} be a set of positions. Then,
SI (A )⊥ = PI
(
A
⊥
)
and PI (A )⊥ = SI
(
A
⊥
)
.
Proof. See for instance [HP03, Theorem 1.5.7] 
Given a code C of length n over a finite field extension Fqm of Fq, the subfield subcode of
C over Fq is the code C ∩ Fnq . The trace code Tr(C ) is the image of C by the componentwise
trace map TrFqm/Fq . We recall an important result due to Delsarte establishing a link between
subfield subcodes and trace codes.
Theorem 2 (Delsarte Theorem [Del75, Theorem 2]). Let E be a linear code of length n defined
over Fqm . Then
(E ∩ Fnq ) = Tr(E ⊥)
⊥
.
The following classical result is extremely useful in the next sections.
Proposition 3. Let A be a code over Fqm of length n and I ⊆ {0, . . . , n− 1}, then, we have:
(a) PI (Tr(A )) = Tr(PI (A ));
(b) Tr(SI (A )) ⊆ SI (Tr(A )).
(c) SI (A ) ∩ Fn−|I|q = SI
(
A ∩ Fnq
)
;
(d) PI
(
A ∩ Fnq
) ⊆ PI (A ) ∩ Fn−|I|q ;
Proof. The componentwise trace map and the puncturing map commute with each other,
which proves (a). To prove (b), let c ∈ A be a codeword whose entries with indexes in I are
all equal to 0. We have Tr(cI) ∈ Tr(SI (A )). Moreover, the entries of Tr(c) with indexes in
I are also equal to 0, hence Tr(cI) = Tr(c)I ∈ SI (Tr(A )). This proves (b). By duality, (c)
and (d) can be directly deduced from (a) and (b) thanks to Proposition 1 and Theorem 2. 
2.4. Generalized Reed–Solomon and Alternant codes.
Definition 1 (Generalized Reed-Solomon code). Let q be a prime power and k, n be integers
such that 1 6 k < n 6 q. Let x and y be two n-tuples such that the entries of x are
pairwise distinct elements of Fq and those of y are nonzero elements in Fq. The generalized
Reed-Solomon code (GRS in short) GRSk(x,y) of dimension k associated to (x,y) is defined
as
GRSk(x,y)
def
=
{(
y0p(x0), . . . , yn−1p(xn−1)
) ∣∣ p ∈ Fq[z]<k}
=
{
y ⋆ p(x)
∣∣ p ∈ Fq[z]<k}.
Reed-Solomon codes correspond to the case where y = 1 and are denoted as RSk(x). The
vectors x and y are called the support and the multiplier of the code.
In the sequel, we will also use the terms support and multiplier without refering to a
generalized Reed-Solomon code – this term will also appear in the context of Goppa and
alternant codes. In this case, when we say that a vector x ∈ Fnq is a support, this means that
all its entries are distinct. Likewise, when we say that a vector y ∈ Fnq is a multiplier, this
means that all its entries are different from zero.
6 ALAIN COUVREUR, AYOUB OTMANI, AND JEAN–PIERRE TILLICH
Proposition 4. Let x,y be as in Definition 1. Then,
GRSk(x,y)
⊥ = GRSn−k(x,y
−1 ⋆ π′
x
(x)−1)
where πx is the locator polynomial of x as defined in § 2.2 and π
′
x
denotes its first derivative.
Proof. See for instance [Rot06, Prop. 5.2 & Problems 5.6, 5.7]. 
This leads to the definition of alternant codes ([MS86, Chap. 12, § 2]).
Definition 2 (Alternant code). Let x,y ∈ Fnqm be a support and a multiplier. Let ℓ be a
positive integer, the alternant code Aℓ(x,y) defined over Fq is defined as
Aℓ(x,y)
def
= GRSℓ(x,y)
⊥ ∩ Fnq .
The integer ℓ is referred to as the degree of the alternant code and m as its extension degree.
Proposition 5 ([MS86, Chap. 12, § 2]). Let x,y be as in Definition 2.
(1) dimFq Aℓ(x,y) > n−mℓ;
(2) dmin(Aℓ(x,y)) > ℓ+ 1;
where dmin(·) denotes the minimum distance of a code.
From Definition 2, it is clear that alternant codes inherit the decoding algorithms of the
underlying GRS codes. The key feature of an alternant code is the following fact (see [MS86,
Chap. 12, § 9]):
Fact 1. There exists a polynomial time algorithm decoding all errors of Hamming weight at
most ⌊ ℓ2⌋ once the vectors x and y are known.
The following description of alternant codes, will be extremely useful in this article.
Lemma 6. Let x, y, ℓ be as in Definition 2. We have:
Aℓ(x,y) =
{(
1
yiπ′x(xi)
f(xi)
)
06i<n
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fqm [z]<n−ℓ
}
∩ Fnq
=
{
y−1 ⋆ π′
x
(x)−1 ⋆ f(x)
∣∣ f ∈ Fqm[z]<n−ℓ} ∩ Fnq .
2.5. Classical Goppa codes.
Definition 3. Let x ∈ Fnqm be a support and Γ ∈ Fqm[z] be a polynomial such that Γ(xi) 6= 0
for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. The classical Goppa code G (x,Γ) over Fq associated to Γ and
supported by x is defined as
G (x,Γ)
def
= Adeg Γ(x,Γ(x)
−1).
We call Γ the Goppa polynomial and m the extension degree of the Goppa code.
As for alternant codes, the following description of Goppa codes, which is due to Lemma 6
will be extremely useful in this article.
Lemma 7. Let x,Γ be as in Definition 3. We have,
G (x,Γ) =
{(
Γ(xi)
π′
x
(xi)
f(xi)
)
06i<n
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fqm[z]<n−deg(Γ)
}
∩ Fnq
=
{
Γ(x) ⋆ π′
x
(x)−1 ⋆ f(x)
∣∣ f ∈ Fqm [z]<n−deg(Γ)} ∩ Fnq .
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The interesting point about this subfamily of alternant codes is that under some conditions,
Goppa codes can correct more errors than a general alternant code.
Theorem 8 ([SKHN76, Theorem 4]). Let γ ∈ Fqm[z] be a squarefree polynomial. Let x ∈ Fnqm
be a support, then
G
(
x, γq−1
)
= G (x, γq) .
Codes with such a Goppa polyomial are called wild Goppa codes. From Fact 1, wild
Goppa codes correct up to ⌊ qr2 ⌋ errors in polynomial-time instead of just ⌊ (q−1)r2 ⌋ if viewed
as Ar(q−1)(x, γ
−(q−1)(x))). On the other hand, these codes have dimension > n −mr(q − 1)
instead of > n −mrq. Notice that when q = 2, this amounts to double the error correction
capacity. It is one of the reasons why binary Goppa codes have been chosen in the original
McEliece scheme or why Goppa codes with Goppa polynomials of the form γq−1 are proposed
in [BLP10, BLP11].
Remark 1. Actually, [SKHN76, Theorem 4] is more general and asserts that given irre-
ducible polynomials f1, . . . , fs ∈ Fqm [z], a polynomial g prime to f1 · · · fs and positive integers
a1, . . . , as, then
G
(
x, fa1q−11 · · · fasq−1s g
)
= G (x, fa1q1 · · · fasqs g) .
2.6. Shortening Alternant and Goppa codes. The shortening operation will play a cru-
cial role in our attack. For this reason, we recall the following classical result. We give a proof
because of a lack of references.
Proposition 9. Let x ∈ Fnqm be a support and let y ∈ Fnqm be a multiplier, then
SI (Ar(x,y)) = Ar(xI ,yI).
Proof. This proposition follows on the spot from the definition of the alternant code Ar(x,y):
there is a parity-check H for it with entries over Fqm which is the generating matrix of
GRSr(x,y). A parity-check matrix of the shortened code SI (Ar(x,y)) is obtained by throw-
ing away the columns of H that belong to I . That is to say, by puncturing GRSr(x,y) at I .
This parity-check matrix is therefore the generator matrix ofGRSr(xI ,yI) and the associated
code is Ar(xI ,yI). 
Corollary 10. Let Γ ∈ Fqm [z] and x ∈ Fnqm be a support. Let I ⊆ {0, . . . , n− 1}, then
SI (G (x,Γ)) = G (xI ,Γ) .
2.7. McEliece encryption scheme. We recall here the general principle of McEliece public-
key scheme [McE78]. The key generation algorithm picks a random k×n generator matrix G
of a code C over Fq which is itself randomly picked in a family of codes for which t errors can
be efficiently corrected. The secret key is the decoding algorithm D associated to C and the
public key is G. To encrypt u ∈ Fkq , the sender chooses a random vector e in Fnq of Hamming
weight less than or equal to t and computes the ciphertext c = uG + e. The receiver then
recovers the plaintext by applying D on c.
McEliece based his scheme solely on binary Goppa codes. In [BLP10, BLP11], it is advo-
cated to use q-ary wild Goppa codes, i.e. codes with Goppa polynomials of the form γq−1
because of their better error correction capability (Theorem 8). In this paper, we precisely
focus on these codes but defined over quadratic extensions (m = 2). We shall see how it is
possible to fully recover their secret structure under some mild condition on q and the degree
of γ (further details in Table 2).
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3. A Distinguisher based on Square Codes
3.1. Square code. One of the keys for the distinguisher presented here and the attack out-
lined in the subsequent sections is a special property of certain alternant codes with respect
to the component-wise product.
Definition 4 (Product of codes, square code). Let A and B be two codes of length n. The
Schur product code denoted by A ⋆B is the vector space spanned by all products a ⋆ b for all
(a, b) ∈ A ×B. When B = A , A ⋆A is called the square code of A and is denoted by A ⋆2.
The dimension of the Schur product is easily bounded by:
Proposition 11. Let A and B be two linear codes ⊆ Fnq , then
dim (A ⋆ B) 6 min
{
n, dimA dimB −
(
dim(A ∩B)
2
)}
(1)
dim
(
A
⋆2
)
6 min
{
n,
(
dim(A ) + 1
2
)}
.(2)
Proof. Let {e1, . . . , es} be a basis of A ∩B. Complete it as two bases BA = {e1, . . . , es, as+1,
. . . , ak} and BB = {e1, . . . , es, bs+1, . . . , bℓ} of A and B respectively. The Schur products u⋆v
where u ∈ BA and v ∈ BB span A ⋆B. The number of such products is kℓ = dimA dimB
minus the number of products which are counted twice, namely the products ei ⋆ej with i 6= j
and their number is precisely
(
s
2
)
. This proves (1). The inequality given in (2) is a consequence
of (1). 
It is proved in [CCMZ15, Ran15] that, almost all codes of a given length and dimension
reach these bounds while GRS codes behave completely differently when they have the same
support.
Proposition 12. Let x ∈ Fnq be a support and y, y′ be two multipliers in Fnq . Then,
(i) GRSk(x,y) ⋆GRSk′(x,y
′) = GRSk+k′−1(x,y ⋆ y
′);
(ii) GRSk(x,y)
⋆2 = GRS2k−1(x,y ⋆ y).
This proposition shows that the dimension of GRSk(x,y) ⋆ GRSk′(x,y
′) does not scale
multiplicatively as kk′ but additively as k + k′ − 1. It has been used the first time in crypt-
analysis in [Wie10] and appears for instance explicitly as Proposition 10 in [MCMMP12]. We
provide the proof here because it is crucial for understanding why the Schur products of GRS
codes and some alternant codes behave in a non generic way.
Proof of Proposition 12. In order to prove (i), let c = (y0f(x0), . . . , yn−1f(xn−1)) ∈ GRSk(x,y)
and c′ = (y′0g(x0), . . . , y
′
n−1g(xn−1)) ∈ GRSk′(x,y′) where deg(f) 6 k−1 and deg(g) 6 k′−1.
Then c ⋆ c′ is of the form:
c ⋆ c′ = (y0y
′
0f(x0)g(x0), . . . , yn−1y
′
n−1f(xn−1)g(xn−1))
= (y0y
′
0r(x0), . . . , yn−1y
′
n−1r(xn−1))
where deg(r) 6 k + k′ − 2. Conversely, any element (y0y′0r(x0), . . . , yn−1y′n−1r(xn−1)) where
deg(r) 6 k+ k′− 2, is a linear combination of Schur products of two elements of GRSk(x,y).
Statement (ii) is a consequence of (i) by putting y′ = y and k′ = k. 
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Since an alternant code is a subfield subcode of a GRS code, we might suspect that products
of alternant codes have also low dimension compared to products of random codes. This is
true but in a very attenuated form as shown by:
Theorem 13. Let x ∈ Fnqm be a support and y,y′ ∈ Fnqm be two multipliers. Then,
(3) As(x,y) ⋆As′(x,y
′) ⊆ As+s′−n+1(x,y′′),
for y′′
def
= y ⋆ y′ ⋆ π′
x
(x).
Proof. Let c, c′ be respective elements of As(x,y) and As′(x,y
′). From Lemma 6,
c = f(x) ⋆ y−1 ⋆ π′
x
(x)−1 and c′ = g(x) ⋆ y′
−1
⋆ π′
x
(x)−1
for some polynomials f and g of degree < n− s and < n− s′ respectively. This implies that
c ⋆ c′ = h(x) ⋆ y−1 ⋆ y′
−1
⋆ π′
x
(x)−2
where h
def
= fg is a polynomial of degree < 2n − (s + s′) − 1. Moreover, since c and c′ have
their entries in Fq then so has c ⋆ c
′. Consequently,
c ⋆ c′ ∈ GRS2n−(s+s′)−1(x,y−1 ⋆ y′−1 ⋆ π′x(x)−2) ∩ Fnq .
From Definition 2, the above code equals As+s′−n+1(x,y
′′) for y′′ = y ⋆ y′ ⋆ π′
x
(x). 
3.2. The particular case of wild Goppa codes over quadratic extensions. Theorem 13
generalizes Proposition 12 which corresponds to the particular case where the extension degree
m is equal to 1. However, when m > 1, the right hand term of (3) is in general the full space
Fnq . Indeed, assume that m > 1 and that the dimensions of As(x,y) and As′(x,y
′) are equal
to n− sm and n− s′m respectively. If we assume that both codes have non trivial dimensions
then we should have n− sm > 0 and n− s′m > 0 which implies that s, s′ < n/m 6 n/2 and
hence:
(s+ s′)− n+ 2 6 0
which entails that As+s′−n+1(x,y
′′) is the full space Fnq .
However, in the case m = 2 and when either:
(i) As(x,y) or As′(x,y
′) has dimension which exceeds the lower bound n− sm or n− s′m
(ii) or when one of these codes is actually an alternant code for a larger degree i.e. As(x,y) =
As′′(x,y
′) for s′′ > s and some multiplier y′
then the right-hand term of (3) may be smaller than the full space. This is precisely what
happens for wild Goppa codes of extension degree 2 as shown by the following statement.
Theorem 14 ([COT14a]). Let G
(
x, γq−1
)
be a wild Goppa code of length n defined over Fq
with support x ∈ Fnq2 where γ ∈ Fq2 [z] is irreducible of degree r > 1. Then,
(i) G
(
x, γq−1
)
= G
(
x, γq+1
)
(ii) dim(G
(
x, γq+1
)
) > n− 2r(q + 1) + r(r + 2)
(iii) G
(
x, γq+1
)
= u ⋆Ar(q+1)(x,1) for some multiplier u ∈ Fnq .
Proof. The results (i) and (ii) are straightforward consequences of Theorems 1 and 24 of
[COT14a]. Only (iii) requires further details. First, let us consider the case where x is a
full–support, that is if n = q2, then from [COT14a, Corollary 10], we have
(4) G
(
x, γq+1
)
= a ⋆
(
RSq2−r(q+1)(x) ∩ Fnq
)
,
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for some multiplier a ∈ Fnq . Then, from Proposition 4, we have
RSq2−r(q+1)(x) = GRSr(q+1)(x, π
′
x
(x)−1)⊥.
Since x is assumed to be full then π′
x
(x) = 1. Therefore, from Definition 2 we see that (4) is
equivalent to:
G
(
x, γq+1
)
= u ⋆ (RSr(q+1)(x)
⊥ ∩ Fnq )(5)
= u ⋆ Ar(q+1)(x,1),(6)
which yields (iii). The general case, i.e. when x is not full can be deduced from the full
support case by shortening thanks to Proposition 9. 
3.3. Wild Goppa codes with non generic squares. In what follows, we prove that a wild
Goppa code over a quadratic extension G
(
x, γq−1
)
whose length belongs to some interval
[n−, n+] has a square with a non generic behaviour. The bounds n− and n+ of the interval
depend only on the degree of γ and will be explicitly described. The corresponding wild Goppa
codes have rather short length compared to the full support ones and very low rate (ratio k/n
where k denotes the dimension).
We emphasize that public keys proposed for McEliece have not a length in the interval
[n−, n+]. However, thanks to Corollary 10, a shortening of the public key is a wild Goppa
code with the same Goppa polynomial but with a shorter length and a lower rate. This is the
point of our "distinguisher by shortening" described in the subsequent sections.
3.3.1. The parameters of wild Goppa codes with non generic squares. Let C = G
(
x, γq−1
)
be a
wild Goppa code over a quadratic extension. We look for a sufficient condition on the length of
C for its square to have a non generic behavior. From Theorem 14, we have C = G
(
x, γq+1
)
.
Thus, it is an alternant code of degree r(q + 1) and from Theorem 13:
(7) C ⋆2 ⊆ A2r(q+1)+1−n(x,y)
for some multiplier y ∈ Fnq2 . Let R be a random code with the same length and dimension as
C . With high probability, we get
(8) dimR⋆2 = min
{
n ,
(
dimC + 1
2
)}
·
Therefore, C is distinguishable from R when the following conditions are both satisfied:
dimA2r(q+1)+1−n(x,y) < n(D1)
dimA2r(q+1)+1−n(x,y) <
(
dimC + 1
2
)
.(D2)
Using the very definition of alternant codes (Definition 2), one proves easily that an alternant
code is different from its ambient space if and only if its degree is positive. Thus, (D1) is
equivalent to:
(9) n 6 2r(q + 1).
Next, from Theorem 14(ii), we have
(10) dimC > n− 2r(q + 1) + r(r + 2).
Moreover, from Theorem 5(1) on the dimension of alternant codes, we have
(11) dimA2r(q+1)+1−n(x,y) > 3n− 4r(q + 1)− 2.
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Assume that the above lower bounds (10) and (11) on the dimensions of C and A2r(q+1)+1−n(x,y)
are their actual dimension (which holds true in general). In such a case, (D2) becomes equiv-
alent to
(12)
(
n− 2r(q + 1) + r(r + 2) + 1
2
)
> 3n − 4r(q + 1)− 2.
Therefore, if the length n of C satisfies both (9) and (12), then its square has a non generic
dimension. Now, consider the map
ϕ : n 7−→
(
n− 2r(q + 1) + r(r + 2) + 1
2
)
− 3n+ 4r(q + 1) + 2.
Its first derivative is
ϕ′(n) = n− 2r(q + 1) + r(r + 2) + 1
2
− 3 = n− 2r(q + 1) + r(r + 2)− 5
2
.
Hence, for n > 2r(q + 1)− r(r + 2) + 52 , the map ϕ is increasing.
There are two cases to consider :
(i) either (12) is not satisfied for the largest possible value of n satisfying (9), namely n =
2r(q + 1) and then the fact that ϕ is increasing implies that it can not be satisfied by any
value of n;
(ii) or (12) is satisfied for n = 2r(q + 1) and then the set of values n satisfying both (9) and
(12) is an interval of the form [n−, n+] where n+ = 2r(q+1) and n− is the smallest n satisfying
(12).
Notice that (12) is satisfied for n = 2r(q + 1) if and only if
(13)
(
r(r + 2) + 1
2
)
> 2r(q + 1)− 2.
The whole discussion can be summarized by
Conclusion. Assuming that the above lower bounds (10) and (11) on the dimensions of C
and A2r(q+1)+1−n(x,y) are their actual dimension and if (13) holds, then there is a nonempty
interval [n−, n+] of integers such that C
⋆2 has a non generic behaviour for any n in [n−, n+]
Moreover,
(1) n+ = 2r(q + 1);
(2) n− is the least integer such that(
n− 2r(q + 1) + r(r + 2) + 1
2
)
> 3n − 4r(q + 1)− 2.
For a length exceeding n+, the square will probably be equal to the whole ambient space,
while for a length less than n−, the square will probably have a dimension equal to that of a
square random code.
3.4. A distinguisher by shortening. It can easily be checked that proposed public keys
for McEliece have a length far above the upper bound n+ described in the previous section.
However the previously described interval [n−, n+] only depends on the degree r of γ. More-
over, according to Corollary 10, shortening C provides a shorter Goppa code with the same
Goppa polynomial. This leads to the first fundamental result of this article.
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Theorem 15. Let C be the wild Goppa code G
(
x, γq−1
)
, where γ ∈ Fq2 [z] has degree r < q.
If the following inequality holds,(
r(r + 2) + 1
2
)
> 2r(q + 1)− 2,
then there is a nonempty interval [a−, a+] ⊆ [1, n] such that for all I ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1} with
|I| ∈ [a−, a+], the dimension of SI (C )⋆2 is less than that of almost all squares of random
codes of the same length and dimension. Moreover,
(1) a− = n− 2r(q + 1);
(2) a+ is the largest integer such that(
n− a+ − 2r(q + 1) + r(r + 2) + 1
2
)
> 3(n − a+)− 4r(q + 1)− 2.
Proof. Apply the reasoning of § 3.3.1 to SI (C ), i.e. replace everywhere n by n− |I|. 
3.5. Experimental observation and example. Actually, in all our experiments we ob-
served that SI (C )⋆2 has always codimension 1 in the code A2r(q+1)+1−n(xI ,yI) (see (7)).
This allows to replace the strict inequalities in (D1) and (D2) by large ones and provides a
slightly larger distinguisher interval [a−, a+], which turns out to be the actual distinguisher
interval according to our experiments. Namely
(1) a− = n− 2r(q + 1)− 1;
(2) a+ is the largest integer such that(
n− a+ − 2r(q + 1) + r(r + 2) + 1
2
)
> 3(n − a+)− 4r(q + 1)− 3.
This interval is nonempty as soon as:(
r(r + 2) + 2
2
)
> 2r(q + 1).
We checked that this allows to distinguish from random codes all the wild Goppa codes of
extension degree 2 suggested in [BLP10] when r > 3. For instance, the first entry in [BLP10,
Table 7.1] is a wild Goppa code C defined over F29 of length 794, dimension 529 with a Goppa
polynomial γ29 where deg γ = 5. Table 1 shows that for a in the range {493, . . . , 506} the
dimensions of SI (C )⋆2 differ from those of a random code with the same parameters. Note
that for this example a− = 493.
It is only when the degree of γ is very small and the field size large that we cannot distinguish
the Goppa code in this way. In Table 2, we gathered upper bounds on the field size for which
we expect to distinguish G
(
x, γq−1
)
from a random code in terms of the degree of γ.
4. The code filtration
In this section, C denotes a wild Goppa code G
(
x, γq−1
)
over a quadratic extension. The
crucial ingredient of our attack is the computation of a family of nested codes from the
knowledge of the public key. According to the common terminology in commutative algebra,
we call such a family a filtration. Roughly speaking, given the public code C = G
(
x, γq−1
)
,
we aim at computing a filtration:
Ca(0) ⊇ Ca(1) ⊇ · · · ⊇ Ca(s) ⊇ · · ·
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Table 1. Dimension of SI (C )⋆2 when C is either the wild Goppa code in the
first entry of [BLP10, Table 7.1], or a random code of the same length and
dimension for various values |I|.
|I| 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504
Goppa 300 297 294 291 288 285 282 279 276 273 270 267
Random 301 300 299 298 297 296 295 294 293 292 291 290
|I| 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514
Goppa 264 261 253 231 210 190 171 153 136 120
Random 289 276 253 231 210 190 171 153 136 120
Table 2. Largest field size q for which we can expect to distinguish G
(
x, γq−1
)
when γ is an irreducible polynomial in Fq2 [z] of degree r.
r 2 3 4 5
q 9 19 37 64
such that Ca(0) is some puncturing of C . Moreover, we wish the filtration to have a good
behavior with respect to the Schur product. Ideally we would expect something like:
“ i+ j = k + ℓ =⇒ Ca(i) ⋆ Ca(j) = Ca(k) ⋆ Ca(ℓ).”
This is exactly what would happen if C is a GRS code (see §4.1). Unfortunately, in the
case of a wild Goppa code such a requirement is too strong and we will only have a weaker
but sufficient version asserting that Ca(i) ⋆ Ca(j) and Ca(k) ⋆ Ca(ℓ) are contained in a same
alternant code. This is detailed further in Corollary 20.
Roughly speaking, the code Ca(j) (see Definition 5 below) consists in the codewords of C
obtained from polynomials having a zero of order at least j at position a. The key point is
that this filtration reveals a lot about the algebraic structure of C . In particular, we will
be able to recover the support from it. To understand the rationale behind such a filtration
its computation and its use for cryptanalysis, let us start with an illustrative example on
generalized Reed Solomon codes.
4.1. Illustrative example with GRS codes. Let x,y be a support and a multiplier in Fnq2 .
Let k < n/2. Assume that the codes GRSk(x,y) and GRSk−1(x,y) are known. We claim
that from the single knowledge of these two codes, it possible to compute the whole filtration
(14) GRSk(x,y) ⊇ GRSk−1(x,y) ⊇ · · · ⊇ GRSi(x,y) ⊇ · · · ⊇ GRS1(x,y) ⊇ {0},
Remark 2. In terms of polynomials, this filtration corresponds to:
(15) Fq2 [z]<k ⊇ Fq2 [z]<k−1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Fq2 [z]<i ⊇ · · · ⊇ Fq2 [z]<1 ⊇ {0}.
Let us explain how we could compute GRSk−2(x,y). From Proposition 12, we obtain
(16) GRSk−2(x,y) ⋆GRSk(x,y) =GRSk−1(x,y)
⋆2
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and from this equality, one can prove that:
(17) GRSk−2(x,y) =
{
c ∈GRSk−1(x,y) | c ⋆GRSk(x,y) ⊆ GRSk−1(x,y)⋆2
}
.
Indeed, inclusion “⊆” is a direct consequence of (16). The converse inclusion can be ob-
tained by studying the degrees in the associated spaces of polynomials (see [CGG+14, §6]).
Thus, Equation (17) shows that GRSk−2(x,y) can be computed from the single knowledge of
GRSk(x,y) and GRSk−1(x,y). By iterating this process, one can compute all the terms of
the filtration (14). Finally, since the last nonzero term GRS1(x,y) is obtained by evaluation
of constant polynomials, this space has dimension 1 and is spanned by y. This yields y up to
a multiplication by a scalar.
This is an illustration of how the computation of a filtration can provide crucial information
on a code. On the other hand, there is no reason to know GRSk−1(x,y) especially in a
cryptographic situation. However, some very particular subcodes of codimension 1 can be
easily computed from the knowledge of GRSk(x,y). Namely, shortening Si (GRSk(x,y))
at a single position i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} can be computed by Gaussian elimination. This code
corresponds to the space of polynomials vanishing at xi, that is the space (z − xi)Fq[z]<k−1,
or, after a suitable change of variables, the space zFq[z]<k−1 of polynomials vanishing at 0.
Therefore, using the method described above, from GRSk(x,y) and its shortening at the i–th
position, one can compute the filtration of codes corresponding to the spaces of polynomials:
(18) Fq[z]<k ⊇ zFq[z]<k−1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ zjFq[z]<k−j ⊇ · · · ⊇ zk−1Fq[z]<1 ⊇ {0}.
The computation of such filtrations permits a complete recovery of x,y (see [CGG+14] for
further details). This is exactly the spirit of our attack on wild Goppa codes.
Remark 3. From an algebraic geometric point of view, the filtrations (15) and (18) are very
close to each other. Filtration (18) is the filtration associated to the valuation at 0 while
filtration (15) is associated to the degree which can be regarded as a valuation at infinity.
Thus, investigating a filtration like (18) is extremely natural.
4.2. The computation of particular subcodes. In the previous examplel and also in what
follows, the computation of a term of a filtration can be done from the previous ones by solving
a problem of the form:
Problem 1. Given A , B, and D be three codes in Fnq find the subcode S of elements s in
D satisfying:
(19) s ⋆ A ⊆ B
Such a code can be computed by linear algebra or equivalently by computing dual codes
and Schur products. Namely, we have:
Proposition 16. The solution space S of Problem 1 is:
S =
(
A ⋆B⊥
)⊥ ∩D .
Proof. Let s ∈ S then clearly s ∈ D . Let a ∈ A and b⊥ ∈ B⊥. Then,
〈s,a ⋆ b⊥〉 =
n−1∑
i=0
ziaib
⊥
i = 〈s ⋆ a, b⊥〉
and this last term is zero by definition of S . This proves S ⊆ (A ⋆ B⊥)⊥∩D . The converse
inclusion is proved in the very same way. 
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4.3. The filtration of alternant codes Ca(j). In the same spirit as the example of §4.1, we
will compute the terms of a filtration by solving iteratively problems of the form of Problem 1.
The filtration we will compute is in some sense related to the polynomial spaces filtration:
Fq2 [z]<k ⊇ zFq2 [z]<k−1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ zjFq2 [z]<k−j ⊇ · · · ⊇ zk−1Fq2 [z]<1 ⊇ {0}.
For that purpose, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 5. For all a ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} and for all s ∈ Z, we define the code Ca(s) as:
Ca(s)
def
=
{(
γq+1(xi)
π′
x
(xi)
(xi − xa)sf(xi)
)
i∈{0,...,n−1}\{a}
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−r(q+1)−s
}
∩ Fn−1q .
Roughly speaking, for s > 0, the code Ca(s) is the subcode of Sa (C ) obtained from rational
fractions vanishing at xa with order at least s.
The link with C becomes clearer if we use Theorem 14, which asserts that C = G
(
x, γq+1
)
.
Thanks to Lemma 7 on the description of Goppa codes as evaluation codes, we have:
(20) C =
{(
γq+1(xi)
π′
x
(xi)
f(xi)
)
06i<n
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−r(q+1)
}
∩ Fnq .
From now on, we focus on the case a = 0 and assume that
Assumption 17. (i) S0 (C ) 6= C
(ii) x0 = 0, x1 = 1.
Discussion about these assumptions. If C is not the zero code, after possibly reordering
the support we can always assume that the first position is not always equal to 0 in every
codeword of C and therefore S0 (C ) 6= C . The second assumption can always be made, and
this without reordering the support- this follows directly from Lemma 24.
Every statement in what follows could be reformulated for a general position a. This would
however provide heavier notation which we have tried to avoid.
The following statement summarizes the properties of this filtration which are used in the
attack. Since its proof is rather technical, we chose to postpone it in appendix.
Proposition 18. Under Assumption 17 (i), we have
(i) C0(1) = S0 (C );
(ii) C0(0) = P0 (C );
(iii) ∀s ∈ Z, dimC0(s)− dimC0(s + 1) 6 2;
(iv) C0(q − r) = C0(q + 1);
(v) ∀s ∈ Z, C0(s) = Ar(q+1)+s−1(x0,y0) for
y0
def
= γ−(q+1)(x0) ⋆ x
−(s−1)
0 ,
where we recall that x0 denotes the vector x punctured at position 0 and that r denotes the
degree of γ.
Proof. Appendix B. 
Corollary 19. For all s > 0, we have
dimC0(s) > n− 1− 2r(q + 1)− 2(s− 1) + r(r + 2).
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Proof. The case s = 1 is a direct consequence of Proposition 18(i) since shortening at one
position reduces the dimension from at most 1. Then the result is proved by induction on s
using Proposition 18(iii). 
Corollary 20. For all pair s, s′ of integers,
C0(s) ⋆ C0(s
′) ⊆ A2r(q+1)+s+s′−n(x0,y0)
where y0 = γ
−2(q+1)(x0) ⋆ x
−(s+s′−2)
0 ⋆ π
′
x0
(x0).
Proof. Apply Proposition 18(v) and Theorem 13 using the fact that C0(s) and C0(s
′) are of
length n− 1. 
4.4. The distinguisher intervals. The filtration
(
C0(s)
)
s∈Z
is strongly related to C since
as explained in Proposition 18(i) and (ii), two elements of the filtration can easily be com-
puted from the pulic key C . Namely, the codes C0(0) and C0(1) are respectively obtained by
puncturing and shortening C at position 0. The subsequent elements of the filtration will be
computed iteratively by solving problems of the form of Problem 1 in the very same manner as
in the example given in Section 4.1. For instance, we will compute C0(2) from the “equation”
“C0(0) ⋆ C0(2) ⊆ C0(1)⋆2”
and more generally C0(t), will be computed from
(21) “C0(0) ⋆ C0(t) ⊆ C0(⌊t/2⌋) ⋆ C0(⌈t/2⌉)”
Unfortunately, this relation is not strictly correct: according to Corollary 20, the right-hand
term should be replaced by A2r(q+1)+t−n(x0,y0) which is unknown. Moreover, as explained in
§3 the above Schur products fill in their ambient space. However, for some particular lengths
it is possible to compute C0(t) by solving a problem of the form of Problem 1. These lengths
are those such that:
(1) The alternant code A2r(q+1)+t−n(x0,y0) does not fill in the ambient space.
(2) The Schur product C0(⌊t/2⌋) ⋆C0(⌈t/2⌉) should fill in A2r(q+1)+t−n(x0,y0) or at least
be a sufficiently large subcode of it.
Let R and R′ be two random codes such that R′ ⊆ R and whose dimensions equal those
of C0(⌊t/2⌋) and C0(⌈t/2⌉). For (2) to be satisfied, we expect that the dimension of R ⋆ R′
exceeds that of A2r(q+1)+t−n(x0,y0). Thus, the computation of C0(t) is possible if the length
of the codes is in some particular interval. Therefore, it is possible to compute SI (C0(t))
for a suitable set I and |I| is in some interval which is nothing but a distinguisher interval
as computed in §3. We will compute these intervals in order to obtain C0(t) by considering
separately the cases of even and odd t.
4.4.1. The symmetric case. Assume that t is even:
t = 2s
for some positive integer s. From Corollary 19, we have
dimC0(s) > (n− 1)− 2(r(q + 1) + s− 1) + r(r + 2).
Since, from Proposition 18(v), this code is alternant of degree r(q + 1) + s − 1. Then from
Corollary 20:
(22) C0(s)
⋆2 ⊆ A2(r(q+1)+s)−n(x0,y0)
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Thus, we are in the very same situation as in §3.4 and the distinguisher interval for C0(s) can
be deduced from that of C by applying the changes of variables
n 7−→ n− 1
r(q + 1) 7−→ r(q + 1) + s− 1.
Conclusion. If (
r(r + 2) + 2
2
)
> 2r(q + 1) + t− 2
then there is a nonempty interval [b−, b+] such that for all I ⊆ {1, . . . , n−1} with |I| ⊆ [b−, b+],
the square of SI (C0(s)) has a non generic behaviour. Moreover,
(1) b− = n− 2r(q + 1)− t;
(2) b+ is the largest integer such that(
n− b+ − 2r(q + 1)− t+ 2 + r(r + 2)
2
)
> 3(n − 1− b+)− 4r(q + 1)− 2t+ 1.
Remark 4. Actually, the above distinguisher interval, relies on an experimental observation
similar to that of §3.5. Namely, we observed experimentally that (22) is a strict inclusion
with codimension 1 as soon as the degree of the alternant code in the right hand term is
non-negative.
4.4.2. The asymmetric case. As in §3.3.1, we start by computing the interval for which the
Schur product C0(s) ⋆C0(s+1) has a non generic behaviour, then we can reduce to that case
by shortening.
In the spirit of the distinguisher interval computed in §3. Instead of Equation (7), Corol-
lary 20 yields
(7’) C0(s) ⋆ C0(s+ 1) ⊆ A2r(q+1)+t−n(x0,y0).
This leads to new distinguisher conditions:
dimA2r(q+1)+t−n(x0,y
′) < n− 1(D1’)
dimA2r(q+1)+t−n(x0,y
′) < dimC0(s) dimC0(s+ 1)−
(
dimC0(s+ 1)
2
)
.(D2’)
According to Proposition 11(1), the right hand term of (D2’) is the typical dimension of the
Schur Product of two random codes of the same dimension as C0(s) and C0(s + 1) if this
product does not fill in the ambient space. From Corollary 19, we have
dimC0(s) > (n− 1)− 2r(q + 1)− 2s + 2 + r(r + 2)
dimC0(s+ 1) > (n− 1)− 2r(q + 1)− 2s + r(r + 2)
Assuming that the above lower bounds are reached, which holds true in general, a computation
from the formula of Proposition 11(1) gives
dimC0(s) dimC0(s + 1)−
(
dimC0(s+ 1)
2
)
=
1
2
d(d + 5)
where
d
def
= (n− 1)− 2r(q + 1)− 2s+ r(r + 2),
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Conclusion. Proceeding as in §3.4 and thanks to an experimental observation similar to
Remark 4, we obtain that if
1
2
r(r + 2) (r(r + 2) + 5) > 2r(q + 1) + t− 2
then there exists an interval [b−, b+] such that for I such that |I| ⊆ [b−, b+], the Schur product
SI (C0(s)) ⋆ SI (C0(s+ 1)) has a non generic behavior. Moreover,
(1) b− = n− 2r(q + 1)− t;
(2) b+ is the largest integer such that
1
2
d(d+ 5) > 3(n − 1− b+)− 4r(q + 1)− 2t+ 1,
where
d = (n− 1− b+)− 2r(q + 1)− 2s+ r(r + 2).
Remark 5. From now on, in both situations (t even or odd), the corresponding interval will
be referred to as the distinguisher interval for C0(t).
4.5. A theoretical result on the multiplicative structure of the filtration. As ex-
plained previously, (21) does not hold in general even for the C0(j)’s even for shortenings at
a set I such that |I| belongs to the distinguisher interval. However, we have the following
Theorem. We explain in the sequel (see §4.6) how to apply it practically. To avoid a huge
amount of notation in its proof, we state it under a condition on the length of the C0(j)’s. It
can then be applied in the general case to suitable shortenings of these codes.
Theorem 21. Let t > 1 be an integer and assume that n < 2r(q + 1) + t. Then,
C0(t) =
{
c ∈ C0(t− 1) | c ⋆ C0(0) ⊆ A2r(q+1)+t−n(x0,y0)
}
where y0
def
= γ−(2q+2)(x0) ⋆ π
′
x0
(x0)
−1 ⋆ x
−(t−2)
0 .
Proof. Inclusion ⊆ is a consequence of Corollary 20. Conversely, let c ∈ C0(t−1) be such that
(23) c ⋆ C0(0) ⊆ A2r(q+1)+t−n(x0,y0).
Choose also an element c′ ∈ C0(0) \ C0(1). From the definition of the C0(j)’s (Definition 5),
these two codewords are of the form:
c = γ(x0)
q+1 ⋆ xt−10 ⋆ π
′
x
(x0)
−1 ⋆ f(x0)
c′ = γ(x0)
q+1 ⋆ π′
x
(x0)
−1 ⋆ g(x0),
where
(24) deg(f) 6 n− r(q + 1)− t and deg(g) 6 n− r(q + 1) − 1
whereas and g does not vanish at 0. From Lemma 25 in Appendix B, we have π′
x
(x0) =
x0 ⋆ π
′
x0
(x0) and hence,
c ⋆ c′ = γ(x0)
2(q+1) ⋆ xt−30 ⋆ π
′
x0
(x0)
−2 ⋆ f(x0) ⋆ g(x0)(25)
= y−10 ⋆ π
′
x0
(x0)
−1 ⋆ x−10 ⋆ f(x0) ⋆ g(x0).(26)
By (23), c ⋆ c′ belongs to A2r(q+1)+t−n(x0,y0). Using the description of alternant codes as
evaluation codes given in Lemma 6, it can therefore be written as
(27) c ⋆ c′ = y−10 ⋆ π
′
x0
(x0)
−1 ⋆ h(x0),
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where
(28) deg(h) < n− 1− 2r(q + 1) − t+ n = 2n− 1− 2r(q + 1)− t.
Putting (26) and (27) together, we get the vector equality x−10 ⋆ f(x0) ⋆ g(x0) = h(x0). Or,
equivalently
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, f(xi)g(xi) = xih(xi).
From (24) and (28), the polynomial f(z)g(z)−zh(z) has degree at most 2n−2r(q+1)− t−1.
Moreover, it has n− 1 roots and, we assumed that n < 2r(q+1)+ t which entails 2n− 2r(q+
1)− t− 1 < n− 1. Therefore, f(z)g(z) − zh(z) has more roots than its degree, which proves
the equality f(z)g(z) = zh(z). Since by assumption, g does not vanish at zero, then z divides
f , which entails that c ∈ C0(t). 
How to use this theorem? Theorem 21 cannot be used directly in the cryptographic context
for two reasons.
(1) In general the inequality n < 2r(q + 1) + t is not satisfied by C .
(2) The alternant code A2r(q+1)+t−n(x0,y0) is unknown.
Issue (1) is addressed by choosing suitable shortenings of the code. To address issue (2),
despite A2r(q+1)+t−n(x0,y0) is unknown, we know a possibly large subcode of it, namely
C0(⌊t/2⌋) ⋆ C0(⌈t/2⌉).
Therefore, to use this result, one shortens the codes C0(⌊t/2⌋) and C0(⌈t/2⌉) at some set
I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that |I| lies in the distinguisher interval for computing C0(t) defined in
§4.4. In this context, one can compute the subcode of SI (C0(t)) defined as:{
c ∈ SI (C0(t− 1)) | c ⋆ SI (C0(0)) ⊆ SI (C0(⌊t/2⌋)) ⋆ SI (C0(⌈t/2⌉))
}
.
In all our experiments, this subcode turned out to be the whole SI (C0(t)).
4.6. The algorithm. One expects to find SI (C0(t)) by solving Problem 1. This allows to find
several of these SI (C0(t))’s associated to different subsets of indexes I . It is straightforward
to use such sets in order to recover C0(t). Indeed, we clearly expect that
(29) SI∩J (C0(t)) = SI (C0(t)) + SJ (C0(t))
where with an abuse of notation we mean by SI (C0(t)) and SJ (C0(t)) the codes SI (C0(t)) and
SJ (C0(t)) whose set of positions have been completed such as to also contain the positions
belonging to I \ J and J \ I respectively and which are set to 0. Such an equality does
not always hold of course, but apart from rather pathological cases it typically holds when
dim (SI (C0(t))) + dim (SI (C0(t))) > dim (SI∩J (C0(t))).
These considerations suggest Algorithm 1 for computing the codes C0(s) for any s > 1. The
value of k(t) computed in line 3 for some t > 2 can also be obtained “offline” by computing the
true dimension of a C0(t) for an arbitrary choice of γ and x. Algorithm 1 uses the knowledge
of C0(0) and C0(1) (see Proposition 18). Observe that in line 5, the cardinality of I has to lie
in the distinguisher interval as explained in Section 4.4. The instruction in line 10 should be
understood as the addition of two codes having the “same” length where by abuse of notation,
SI (C0(t)) means the code SI (C0(t)) to which 0’s have been added in the positions belonging
to I .
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Algorithm 1 Computation of C0(s) with s > 1
1: for t = 2 to s do
2: C0(t)← {0}
3: k(t)← (n− 1)− 2r(q + 1)− 2t+ 2 + r(r + 2)
4: while dimC0(t) 6= k(t) do
5: I ← random subset of {1, . . . , n− 1} such that |I| ∈ [b−, b+] {Section 4.4}
6: A ← SI (C0(0))
7: B ← SI
(
C0(
⌊
t
2
⌋
)
)
⋆ SI
(
C0(
⌈
t
2
⌉
)
)
8: D ← SI (C0(t− 1))
9: SI (C0(t))← D ∩
(
A ⋆ B⊥
)⊥
{Solving of Problem 1}
10: C0(t)← C0(t) + SI (C0(t))
11: end while
12: end for
13: return C0(s)
5. An efficient Attack Using the Distinguisher
In this section, we sketch the complete attack we implemented. We chose to provide only
a short description and to explain it in greater detail in Appendix C. We emphasize that the
crucial aspects of the attack are the distinguisher and the computation of the filtration which
are presented in §3 and §4. As soon as some terms of the filtration are computed, it is possible
to derive some interesting information on the secret key. The attack we present here is one
manner to recover the secret key and we insist on the fact that there might exist many other
ways to recover it from the knowledge of some terms of the filtration. This is further discussed
in §6.
Before describing the attack, we state two key statements.
5.1. Key tools. The first statement is a very particular property of the space C0(q+1). The
fact that the q+1–th term has very particular properties is not surprising. Indeed, recall that
in Fq2 the map x 7→ xq+1 is the norm over Fq. In particular its sends Fq2 onto Fq.
Proposition 22. We have:
x
−(q+1)
0 ⋆ C0(q + 1) ⊆ C0(0).
Proof. Since (q + 1)–th powers in Fq2 are norms over Fq, we have x
q+1
0 ∈ Fn−1q . Therefore,
x
q+1
0 can get out of the subfield subcode
C0(q + 1) =
{(
xq+1i γ
q+1(xi)f(xi)
π′
x
(xi)
)
16i<n
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−(r+1)(q+1)
}
∩ Fn−1q
= xq+10 ⋆
({(
γq+1(xi)f(xi)
π′
x
(xi)
)
16i<n
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−(r+1)(q+1)
}
∩ Fn−1q
)
⊆ xq+10 ⋆
({(
γq+1(xi)f(xi)
π′
x
(xi)
)
16i<n
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−r(q+1)
}
∩ Fn−1q
)
⊆ xq+10 ⋆ C0(0).
POLYNOMIAL TIME ATTACK ON WILD MCELIECE OVER QUADRATIC EXTENSIONS 21

The second statement asserts that the minimal polynomial over Fq of an element t ∈ Fq2
can be deduced from the single knowledge of the norms of t and t− 1.
Lemma 23. Let t be an element of Fq2 and
Pt(z)
def
= z2 − (N(t)− N(t− 1)− 1)z + N(t) ∈ Fq[z].
Then, either t ∈ Fq2 \ Fq and Pt is irreducible in which case is the minimal polynomial of t
over Fq, or t ∈ Fq and Pt(z) = (z − t)2.
Proof. First, notice that
N(t− 1) = (t− 1)q+1 = (t− 1)(t− 1)q = (t− 1)(tq − 1) = tq+1 − tq − t+ 1
= NFq2/Fq (t)− TrFq2/Fq(t) + 1.
Therefore, Pt(z) = z
2 − Tr(t)z + N(t), which is known to be the minimal polynomial of t
whenever t ∈ Fq2 \ Fq. On the other hand, when t ∈ Fq, then Pt(z) = z2 − 2tz + t2 which
factorizes as (z − t)2. 
5.2. Description of the attack. By the 2–transitivity of the affine group, one can assume
without loss of generality that x0 = 0 and x1 = 1 (see Appendix A for further details).
Let us first assume that every element of Fq2 is an entry of x. The general case: n < q
2, is
discussed subsequently.
• Step 1. Compute C0(q+1) using the method described in §4. Notice that, thanks to
Proposition 18(iv) it is sufficient to compute C0(q − r).
• Step 2. Compute the set of solutions c ∈ Fn−1q of the problem
(30)


c ⋆ C0(q + 1) ⊆ P0 (C )
∀i > 1, ci 6= 0, (i.e. c has full weight)
c1 = 1.
From Proposition 22, x
−(q+1)
0 is one of the solutions of this problem. Indeed, it clearly
satisfies the first equation, has full weight (0 has been removed) and its first entry is 1
since we assumed that x1 = 1. One proves in Appendix C.1, that the space of words
c ∈ Fnq such that c⋆C0(q+1) ⊆ P0 (C ) has in general dimension 4 over Fq. Moreover,
with a high probability, this space has only 2 elements with full weight, namely, the
vector x
−(q+1)
0 (which has clearly full weight) and the all–one vector 1.
After these two steps, we know xq+1 which is unsufficient to deduce directly x. However, we
can re–apply Steps 1 and 2 replacing position 0 by position 1. By this manner, we compute
C1(q + 1) and then solve a problem of the same form as (30) which yields (x− 1)q+1.
• Step 3. Apply Lemma 23 to get the minimal polynomial of every entry xi of the
support x. Now, the support is known up to Galois action.
• Step 4. One chooses an arbitrary support x′ such that for all i, xi and x′i have
the same minimal polynomial. That is, for all i either x′i = xi or x
′
i = x
q
i . Since
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C = u ⋆ Ar(q+1)(x,1) (Theorem 14), for some u ∈ (F×q )n, there exist a diagonal
matrix D and a permutation matrix P such that
C = Ar(q+1)(x,1)DP .
The permutation P is the permutation that sends x onto x′. Since it arises from
Galois action, it is a product of transpositions with disjoint supports and the supports
are known. Therefore, the matrix DP is sparse and we know precisely the positions
of the possible nonzero entries. The number of these unknown entries is ≈ 2q2 and
the linear problem
C = Ar(q+1)(x,1)M
whose unknowns the possible nonzero entries of M has more equations than unknowns
and provide easily the matrix DP . From them we recover x and we have
C = Ar(q+1)(x,1)D.
This concludes the attack.
The general case. When the support is not full, the main difficulty is that the resolution
of (30) provides q2 − n other full-weight solutions. Thus we have q2 − n + 1 candidates for
xq+1 and q2 − n+ 1 for (x− 1)q+1. A method is explained in Appendix C.1.3 which permits
to gather candidates by pairs (a, b) where a is a candidate for xq+1 and b a candidate for
(x− 1)q+1. The good pair (xq+1, (x− 1)q+1) lies among these pairs.
Therefore, we have to iterate Steps 3 and 4 for every pair of candidates, which amounts to
q2−n iterations in the worst case. Step 4 is also a bit more complicated in the worst case but
this has no influence on the complexity.
Remark 6. Notice that the computation of the Goppa polynomial is useless to attack the
scheme. Actually, if the secret key is a wild Goppa code G
(
x, γq−1
)
, then it is sufficient to
find a pair of vectors (x,y) such that:
G
(
x, γq−1
)
= Arq(x,y).
Indeed, such a representation as an alternant code allows to correct up to ⌊ qr2 ⌋ errors (see Fact
1 and Theorem 8).
6. Limits and extensions of the attack
According to Lemma 35 and other discussions in Appendix C, the success of the Steps 2 to
4 requires:
n > 2q + 4.
On the other hand, for the first step to work, the distinguisher intervals for the computation
of C0(2) up to C0(q − r) should be non empty, i.e. from §4.4.1,(
r(r + 2) + 2
2
)
> 2r(q + 1) + (q − r)− 2.
However, having a non empty distinguisher interval for the code seems actually sufficient
to proceed to an attack, even if there is no distinguisher interval for the computation of
C0(q − r). Indeed, it is also possible to compute the “negative part” of the filtration, i.e. the
codes C0(−ℓ)’s for ℓ > 0. The code C0(−ℓ) can be computed as{
c ∈ Fnq | c ⋆ C0(0) ⊆ C0(⌊−ℓ/2⌋) ⋆ C0(⌈−ℓ/2⌉)
}
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or, if the Schur products fill in the ambient space, several suitable shortenings of C0(−ℓ) can
be computed by this manner and then summed up to provide the whole C0(−ℓ). By this
manner, as soon as we are able to compute two codes C0(a) and C0(b) such that b− a = q+1
then a statement of the form of Proposition 22 provides xq+10 . This is for instance what we
did for the [851, 619] code over F32 presented in §7.5. For this code it was not possible to
compute C0(q + 1), thus we computed C0(23) and C0(−10).
As a conclusion, the attack or a variant by computing some C0(−ℓ) may work as soon as
n > 2q + 4 and
(
r(r + 2) + 2
2
)
> 2r(q + 1)− 2.
7. Complexity and Implementation
In what follows, by “O(P (n))” for some function P : N→ R, we mean “O(P (n)) operations
in Fq”. We clearly have n 6 q
2 and we also assume that q = O(√n).
7.1. Computation of a code product. Given two codes A ,B of length n and respective
dimensions a and b, the computation of A ⋆B consists first in the computation of a generator
matrix of size ab× n whose computation costs O(nab) operations. Then the Gaussian elimi-
nation costs O(nabmin(n, ab)). Thus the cost of Gaussian elimination dominates that of the
construction step. In particular, for a code A of dimension k >
√
n, the computation of A ⋆2
costs O(n2k2). Thanks to Proposition 16, one shows that the dominant part of the resolution
of Problem 1, consists in computing A ⋆B⊥ and hence costs O(na(n− b)min(n, a(n− b)))
7.2. Computation of the filtration. We first evaluate the cost of computing SI (C0(s+ 1))
from SI (C0(s)). The distinguisher interval described in §4.4 suggests that the dimension of
SI (C0(s)) used to compute the filtration is in O(
√
n). From §7.1, the computation of the
square of SI (C0(s)) costs O(n3) operations in Fq. Then, the resolution of Problem 16 in the
context of Theorem 21, costs O(na(n−b)min(n, a(n−b))) where a = dimSI (C0(s)) = O(
√
n)
and b = dimA2r(q+1)+t−n+|I|(xI∪{0},y). We have n − b = O(n), hence we get a cost of
O(n3√n).
The heuristic below Proposition 16 suggests that we need to perform this computation for
O(√n) choices of I . Since addition of codes is negligible compared to O(n3√n) this leads to
a total cost of O(n4) for the computation of C0(s+1). This computation should be done q+1
times (actually q − r times from Proposition 18(iv) and, we assumed that q = O(√n). Thus,
the computation of C0(q + 1) costs O(n4
√
n).
Remark 7. Actually, it is not necessary to compute all the terms of the filtration from C0(1)
to C0(q− r), only log(q− r) of them are sufficient to get C0(q− r) since C0(q− r) is computed
from C0((q − r)/2). This reduces the complexity of this part to O(n4 log(n)).
7.3. Other computations. The resolution of Problem (30) in Step 2, costs O(n4) (see Ap-
pendix C for further details). The solution space D of (30) has Fq–dimension 4 (see Proposi-
tion 33 in Appendix C). Moreover, since we are looking for vectors of maximum weight in these
solution spaces, it is sufficient to proceed to the search in the corresponding 3–dimensional
projective spaces. Thus, the exhaustive search in these solution spaces costs O(q3) = O(n√n)
which is negligible. The computation of the pairs (see §C.1.3) and that of minimal polynomials
is also negligible. Finally, the resolution of the linear system in Step 4 costs O(n4) since it is
very similar to Problem 1. Since Final step should be iterated q2 − n+ 1 times in the worst
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case, we see that the part of the attack after the computation of the filtration costs at worst
O(n5). Thus, the global complexity of the attack is in O(n5) operations in Fq.
7.4. Shortcuts. It is actually possible to reduce the complexity. Indeed, many linear systems
we have to solve have b equations and a unknowns with b≫ a. For such systems it is possible
to extract a + ǫ equations chosen at random and solve this subsystem which has the same
solution set with a high probability. This probabilistic shortcut permits the computation of
the square of a code in O(n3) and reduces the cost of Step 4 to O(n3). By this manner we
have an overall complexity of O(n4).
7.5. Implementation. This attack has been implemented with Magma [BCP97] and run
over random examples of codes corresponding to the seven entries [BLP10, Table 1] for which
m = 2 and r > 3. For all these parameters, our attack succeeded. We summarize here the
average running times for at least 50 random keys per 4–tuple of parameters, obtained with
an IntelR© Xeon 2.27GHz.
(q, n, k, r) (29,781, 516,5) (29, 791, 575, 4) (29,794,529,5) (31, 795, 563, 4)
Average time 16min 19.5min 15.5min 31.5min
(q, n, k, r) (31,813, 581,4) (31, 851, 619, 4) (32,841,601,4)
Average time 31.5min 27.2min 49.5min
Remark 8. In the above table the code dimensions are not the ones mentioned in [BLP10].
What happens here is that the formula for the dimension given [BLP10, p.153,§1] is wrong
for such cases: it understimates the true dimension for wild Goppa codes over quadratic
extensions when the degree r of the irreducible polynomial γ is larger than 2 as shown by
Theorem 14(ii).
All these parameters are given in [BLP10] with a 128-bit security that is measured against
information set decoding attack which is described in [BLP10, p.151, Information set decoding
§1] as the “top threat against the wild McEliece cryptosystem for F3, F4, etc.”. It should be
mentioned that these parameters are marked in [BLP10] by the biohazard symbol h (together
with about two dozens other parameters). This corresponds, as explained in [BLP10], to
parameters for which the number of possible monic Goppa polynomials of the form γq−1 is
smaller than 2128. The authors in [BLP10] choose in this case a support which is significantly
smaller than qm (q2 here) in order to avoid attacks that fix a support of size qm and then
enumerate all possible polynomials. Such attacks exploit the fact that two Goppa codes of
length qm with the same polynomial are permutation equivalent. We recall that the support-
splitting algorithm [Sen00], when applied to permutation equivalent codes, generally finds in
polynomial time a permutation that sends one code onto the other. The authors of [BLP10]
call this requirement on the length the second defense and write [BLP10, p.152].
“The strength of the second defense is unclear: we might be the first to ask whether the
support-splitting idea can be generalized to handle many sets {a1, . . . , an} 1 simultaneously,
and we would not be surprised if the answer turns out to be yes.” The authors also add in
[BLP10, p.154,§1] that “the security of these cases2 depends on the strength of the second
1{a1, . . . , an} means here the support of the Goppa code.
2meaning here the cases marked with h.
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defense discussed in Section 6”. We emphasize that our attack has nothing to do with the
strength or a potential weakness of the second defense. Moreover, it does not exploit at all the
fact that there are significantly less than 2128 Goppa polynomials. This is obvious from the
way our attack works and this can also be verified by attacking parameters which were not
proposed in [BLP10] but for which there are more than 2128 monic wild Goppa polynomials
to check. As an illustration, we are also able to recover the secret key in an average time of 24
minutes when the public key is a code over F31, of length 900 and with a Goppa polynomial
of degree 14. In such case, the number of possible Goppa polynomials is larger than 2134 and
according to Theorem 14, the public key has parameters [n = 900, k > 228, d > 449]31. Note
that security of such a key with respect to information set decoding [Pet10] is also high (about
2125 for such parameters).
8. Conclusion
The McEliece scheme based on Goppa codes has withstood all cryptanalytic attempts up
to now, even if a related system based on GRS codes [Nie86] was successfully attacked in
[SS92]. Goppa codes are subfield subcodes of GRS codes and it was advocated that taking the
subfield subcode hides a lot about the structure of the underlying code and also makes these
codes more random-like. This is sustained by the fact that the distance distribution becomes
indeed random [MS86] by this operation whereas GRS codes behave differently from random
codes with respect to this criterion. This attack presented at the conference EUROCRYPT
2014 was the first example of a cryptanalysis which questions this belief by providing an alge-
braic cryptanalysis which is of polynomial complexity and which applies to many “reasonable
parameters” of a McEliece scheme when the Goppa code is the Fq-subfield subcode of a GRS
code defined over Fq2 . Subsequently to our attack, this uncertainty on the security of code
based cryptosystems using wild Goppa codes has been strengthened by another cryptanalysis
based on the resolution of a system of multivariate polynomial equations [FPdP14].
It could be argued that our attack applies to a rather restricted class of Goppa codes,
namely wild Goppa codes of extension degree two. This class of codes also presents certain
peculiarities as shown by Theorem 14 which were helpful for mounting an attack. However,
it should be pointed out that the crucial ingredient which made this attack possible is the
fact that such codes could be distinguished from random codes by square code considerations.
A certain filtration of subcodes was indeed exhibited here and it turns out that shortened
versions of these codes were related together by the star product. This allowed to reconstruct
the filtration and from here the algebraic description of the Goppa code could be recovered.
The crucial point here is really the existence of such a filtration whose elements are linked
together by the star product. The fact that these codes were linked together by the star
product is really related to the fact that the square code of certain shortened codes of the
public code were of unusually low dimension which is precisely the fact that yielded the
aforementioned distinguisher. This raises the issue whether other families of Goppa codes or
alternant codes which can be distinguished from random codes by such square considerations
[FGO+13] can be attacked by techniques of this kind. This covers high rate Goppa or alternant
codes, but also other Goppa or alternant codes when the degree of extension is equal to 2.
All of them can be distinguished from random codes by taking square codes of a shortened
version of the dual code.
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Appendix A. Reducing to the case x0 = 0, x1 = 1
The fact that we can choose x0 to be equal to 0 and x1 to be equal to 1 for the support x of
C follows at once from the following lemma together with the 2-transitivity of the affine maps
x 7→ ax + b over Fqm . This lemma is basically folklore, but since we did not find a reference
giving this lemma in exactly this form we have also provided a proof for it.
Lemma 24. Consider a Goppa code G (x,Γ(x)) defined over Fq and of extension degree m.
Let a, b ∈ Fqm with a 6= 0 and let ψ(z) def= az+ b. We have G (x,Γ(z)) = G
(
ψ(x),Γ(ψ−1(z))
)
.
Proof. We first observe that for any alternant code of some length n, degree r, extension
degree m, defined over Fq we have
(31) Ar(x,y) = Ar(ax+ b,y).
This can be verified as follows. Let c = (ci)06i6n−1 be a codeword in Ar(x,y). We are going
to prove that it also belongs to Ar(ax+ b,y). It suffices to prove that for any polynomial P
in Fqm [X] of degree at most r − 1 we have
∑n−1
i=0 ciyiP (axi + b) = 0. In order to prove this,
let us first observe that we may write P (ax+ b) as a polynomial Q(x) of degree at most r− 1
which depends on a and b. This implies that
n−1∑
i=0
ciyiP (axi + b) =
n−1∑
i=0
ciyiQ(xi) = 0.
where the last equality follows from the definition of Ar(x,y). In other words, we have just
proved that c ∈ Ar(ax+ b,y). This proves that
(32) Ar(x,y) ⊆ Ar(ax+ b,y).
The inclusion in the other direction by observing that by using (32) on Ar(ax+ b,y) with the
affine map Ψ−1 we obtain
Ar(ax+ b,y) ⊆ Ar(Ψ−1(ax+ b),y) = Ar(x,y)
and this proves (31). This is used to finish the proof of Lemma 24 by observing that
G (x,Γ(z)) = Ar(x,y)
= Ar(ax+ b,y)
= G
(
ax+ b,Γ(ψ−1(z))
)
where r = deg Γ and y = Γ(x)−1· 
Appendix B. Further details on the behaviour of the filtration
(
C0(s)
)
s∈Z
The aim of this appendix is to give a complete proof of Proposition 18. For convenience,
let us remind its statement.
Proposition 18 Under Assumption 17 (i), we have
(i) C0(1) = S0 (C );
(ii) C0(0) = P0 (C );
(iii) ∀s ∈ Z, dimC0(s)− dimC0(s + 1) 6 2;
(iv) C0(q − r) = C0(q + 1);
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(v) ∀s ∈ Z, C0(s) = Ar(q+1)+s−1(x0,y0) for
y0
def
= γ−(q+1)(x0) ⋆ x
−(s−1)
0 .
where we recall that x0 denotes the vector x punctured at position 0 and that r denotes the
degree of γ.
The following lemma is useful in the proofs to follow.
Lemma 25. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, we have π′
x
(xi) = xiπ
′
x0
(xi). Equivalently,
π′
x
(x0) = x0 ⋆ π
′
x0
(x0).
Proof. Recall that x0 = 0 and therefore we have:
πx(z) =
n−1∏
i=0
(z − xi) = z
n−1∏
i=1
(z − xi) = zπx0(z).
Therefore, π′
x
(z) = zπ′
x0
(z) + πx0(z) and since πx0(xi) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, we get
the result. 
B.1. Proof of (v) and further results about the structure of the C0(s)’s. We will start
by proving (v). Let s ∈ Z. By definition
C0(s)
def
=
{(
γq+1(xi)
π′
x
(xi)
xsif(xi)
)
i∈{1,...,n−1}
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−r(q+1)−s
}
∩ Fn−1q .
Then, from Lemma 25, we have
C0(s) =
{(
γq+1(xi)
xiπ′x0(xi)
xsif(xi)
)
i∈{1,...,n−1}
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−r(q+1)−s
}
∩ Fn−1q .
=
{(
γq+1(xi)
π′
x0
(xi)
xs−1i f(xi)
)
i∈{1,...,n−1}
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<(n−1)−r(q+1)−(s−1)
}
∩ Fn−1q .
The very definition of alternant codes (Definition 2) yields
C0(s) = Ar(q+1)+s−1(x0,y0), where y0 = γ
−(q+1)(x0) ⋆ x
−(s−1)
0 .
It should be noted that the C0(s)’s can also be viewed as Goppa codes twisted by multiplying
the positions by some fixed constants as explained by the following proposition which sheds
some further light on the structure of the codes C0(s):
Proposition 26. Let u
def
= γq+1(x0) ⋆ x
−r(q+1)
0 where r denotes the degree of the polynomial
γ such that C = G
(
x, γq+1
)
. Then u ∈ Fn−1q and for s > −r(q + 1):
C0(s) = u ⋆ G
(
x0, z
r(q+1)+s−1
)
.
Proof. It has been discussed in § 5.1, that (q + 1)–th powers in Fq2 are norms and hence are
elements of Fq. Therefore, u ∈ Fn−1q . Now, recall the definition of C0(s) as
C0(s)
def
=
{(
γq+1(xi)
π′
x0
(xi)
xs−1i f(xi)
)
i∈{1,...,n−1}
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−r(q+1)−s
}
∩ Fn−1q .
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Since u = γq+1(x0) ⋆x
−r(q+1)
0 is a vector with entries in Fq, it can get in the subfield subcode
and
u−1 ⋆ C0(s) =


(
x
r(q+1)
i
π′
x0
(xi)
xs−1i f(xi)
)
i∈{1,...,n−1}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−1−r(q+1)−(s−1)

 ∩ Fn−1q .
Finally, thanks to the description of Goppa codes as evaluation codes in Lemma 7, the right
hand term of the above equality is G
(
x0, z
r(q+1)+s−1
)
, which concludes the proof. 
B.2. Proof of (i). From (v), applied to s = 1, we have
C0(1) = Ar(q+1)(x0, γ
−(q+1)(x0)).
Thus, the very definition of Goppa codes (Definition 3) entails
C0(1) = G
(
x0, γ
q+1
)
.
Therefore, Corollary 10 on shortened Goppa codes asserts that C0(1) = S0 (C ) .
B.3. Proof of (iii). Let us bring in the family of GRS codes (Fs)s∈Z defined as
(33) Fs
def
=
{(
γq+1(xi)
π′
x0
(xi)
xs−1i f(xi)
)
i∈{1,...,n−1}
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−r(q+1)−s
}
·
We have
∀s ∈ Z, C0(s) = Fs ∩ Fn−1q .
Moreover, it is readily seen that for all s, Fs+1 ⊆ Fs and dimFs − dimFs+1 6 1, with
equality if Fs is nonzero. Then, the proof of (iii) is a direct consequence of the following
lemma.
Lemma 27. Let A ,A ′ ⊆ Fnqm be two codes such that A ⊆ A ′. Then
dimFq(A
′ ∩ Fnq )− dimFq(A ∩ Fnq ) 6 m
(
dimFqm (A
′)− dimFqm (A )
)
.
Proof. Thanks to Delsarte Theorem (Theorem 2) it is equivalent to prove that
dimFq Tr
(
A
⊥
)
− dimFq Tr
(
A
′⊥
)
6 m
(
dimFqm A
⊥ − dimFqm A ′⊥
)
.
To prove it, choose any code B ⊆ Fnqm such that A ⊥ = A ′⊥ ⊕B. Then, we clearly have
dimFq Tr
(
A
⊥
)
6 dimFq Tr
(
A
′⊥
)
+ dimFq Tr (B) .
Finally, from [MS86, § 7.7], we get
dimFq TrB 6 m dimFqm B
6 m
(
dimFqm A
⊥ − dimFqm A ′⊥
)
,
which yields the result. 
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B.4. Proof of (ii). Statement (ii) is less obvious than it looks like and far less obvious than
(i). Indeed, let
F
def
=
{(
γq+1(xi)f(xi)
π′
x
(xi)
)
06i<n
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−r(q+1)
}
·
Using Lemma 25, one proves that F0 = P0 (F ) where F0 is defined in (33). Moreover, we
have:
C = F ∩ Fnq and C0(0) = F0 ∩ Fn−1q .
Therefore,
P0 (C ) = P0
(
F ∩ Fnq
)
while C0(0) = P0 (F ) ∩ Fn−1q .
Hence, from Proposition 3, we get
(34) P0 (C ) ⊆ C0(0)
and there is a priori no reason for the converse inclusion to be true. We will prove this by
first observing that
Proposition 28.
(35) dimC0(0) − dimC0(1) > 1.
Proof. First of all, notice that P0 (C ) = C because C is of minimum distance > 1. Assumption
17 (i) tells us that S0 (C ) 6= C and therefore S0 (C ) is strictly included in P0 (C ). In summary,
thanks to (i) and (34), we have
(36) C0(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=S0(C )
 P0 (C ) ⊆ C0(0)
and hence,
(37) dimC0(0) − dimC0(1) > 1.

On the other hand, we can bound from above this difference of dimensions. This follows
from
Proposition 29. We have
dimC0(1) − dimC0(−r) 6 1.
Proof. From Proposition 26, we have
C0(1) = u ⋆ G
(
x0, z
r(q+1)
)
and C0(−r) = u ⋆ G
(
x0, z
r(q+1)−r−1
)
= u ⋆ G
(
x0, z
rq−1
)
.
From Theorem 8 and Remark 1, we have
G
(
x0, z
rq−1
)
= G (x0, z
rq) .
In addition, from [COT14a, Theorem 4], we have
dimG (x0, z
rq)− dimG
(
x0, z
r(q+1)
)
6 1.
This yields the result. 
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Conclusion. Putting inclusion sequence (36) in the filtration of the C0(j)’s, we get the inclu-
sion sequence
C0(1)  P0 (C ) ⊆ C0(0) ⊆ C0(−1) ⊆ · · · ⊆ C0(−r)
Using Proposition 29, we prove that, in the above inclusion sequence, every inclusion is an
equality but the left-hand one. In particular,
P0 (C ) = C0(0),
which concludes the proof of (ii).
Actually, we got other deep results namely, C0(0) = C0(−r) and dimC0(0)−dimC0(1) 6 1.
Using Proposition 26, we obtain an interesting result on Goppa codes which clarifies [COT14a,
Theorem 4].
Corollary 30. Let ℓ be a positive integer and x ∈ Fnq2 be a support, then:
(i) G
(
x, zℓq−1
)
= G
(
x, zℓ(q+1)−1
)
;
(ii) dimG
(
x, zℓ(q+1)−1
)− dimG (x, zℓ(q+1)) 6 1.
B.5. Proof of (iv). Thanks to Proposition 26, it reduces to prove that
G
(
x0, z
(r+1)(q+1)−1
)
= G
(
x0, z
(r+1)q−1
)
,
which is a direct consequence of Corollary 30(i) in the case ℓ = r + 1.
Appendix C. An in–depth presentation of the attack
Here we give a complete presentation of the attack in the general case, i.e. for a possibly
non full support x. As explained in §5, the attack divides into four steps:
• Step 1. Compute the terms of the filtrations (C0(j))j and (C1(j))j up to C0(q + 1)
and C1(q + 1), using the methods presented in §4.
• Step 2. Compute xq+1 and (x− 1)q+1 thanks to Proposition 22.
• Step 3. Compute the minimal polynomials of every entry xi of the support x using
Lemma 23.
• Step 4. Compute a matrix M solution of the linear problem
C = C ′M
where M is a matrix with many prescribed zero entries and C ′ = Ar(q+1)(x,1) and
obtain from M the whole structure of C ′.
Step 1 is explained in depth in §4 and Step 3 is straightforward (it is a direct application
of Lemma 23). Thus, in this appendix, we give further details on Steps 2 and 4.
C.1. Further details on Step 2 of the attack. As explained in §5, the computation of
xq+1 or, more precisely, that of x
−(q+1)
0 reduces to solving Problem (30) which we recall here:
(30)


c ⋆ C0(q + 1) ⊆ P0 (C )
∀i > 1, ci 6= 0, (i.e. c has full weight)
c1 = 1.
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Remind that, from Proposition 18(ii), we know that P0 (C ) = C0(0). Then, according to
Proposition 16, the subspace of vectors c ∈ Fn−1q such that c ⋆C0(q+1) ⊆ P0 (C ) is the space
D
def
=
(
C0(q + 1) ⋆ C0(0)
⊥
)⊥
.
We will first investigate the structure of D and in particular its dimension. Then, we will study
its set of full weight codewords. For this sake we will use repeatedly the following elementary
lemma.
Lemma 31. Let A ⊆ Fnq be a code and u ⊆ (F×q )n, then
(u ⋆ A )⊥ = u−1 ⋆ (A ⊥).
Proof. Since u is invertible, then, clearly, both codes have the same dimension and it is
sufficient to prove inclusion “⊇”. Let a ∈ A and b ∈ A ⊥, then
〈u ⋆ a,u−1 ⋆ b〉 =
∑
i
uiaiu
−1
i bi =
∑
i
aibi = 〈a, b〉 = 0.
This concludes the proof. 
C.1.1. The structure of the code D . We start with a rather technical statement which is
fundamental in what follows.
Proposition 32. We have
x
−(q+1)
0 ⋆
(
RSq+2(x0) ∩ Fn−1q
) ⊆ D .
Proof. First let us rewrite the codes C0(0) and C0(q + 1) in a more convenient way. By
definition
C0(q + 1) =
{(
γq+1(xi)
π′
x
(xi)
xq+1i f(xi)
)
i∈{1,...,n−1}
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−(r+1)(q+1)
}
∩ Fn−1q
In the very same way as in the proof of Proposition 26, since the (q+1)–th powers are norms
and hence are in Fq, they can get out of the subfield subcode.
C0(q + 1) = γ
q+1(x0) ⋆ x
q+1
0 ⋆
{(
1
π′
x
(xi)
f(xi)
)
i∈{1,...,n−1}
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<n−(r+1)(q+1)
}
∩ Fn−1q .
Since the codes have length n− 1, it is more relevant to write Fq2 [z]<n−(r+1)(q+1) as
Fq2 [z]<(n−1)−(r+1)(q+1)+1 . Then, thanks to Lemma 25, we get
C0(q + 1) = γ
q+1(x0) ⋆ x
q+1
0 ⋆{(
1
xiπ′x0(xi)
f(xi)
)
i∈{1,...,n−1}
∣∣∣∣∣ f ∈ Fq2 [z]<(n−1)−(r+1)(q+1)+1
}
∩ Fn−1q .
Consequently, by the description of alternant codes as evaluation codes (Lemma 6), we obtain
(38) C0(q + 1) = γ
q+1(x0) ⋆ x
q+1
0 ⋆ A(r+1)(q+1)−1(x0,x0).
In the very same manner, we prove that
(39) C0(0) = γ
q+1(x0) ⋆ Ar(q+1)−1(x0,x0).
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From the definition of alternant codes (Definition 2) together with Delsarte Theorem (Theo-
rem 2) and Lemma 31, we get
(40) C0(0)
⊥ = γ−(q+1)(x0) ⋆ Tr
(
GRSr(q+1)−1(x0,x0)
)
From (38) and (40),
C0(q + 1) ⋆ C0(0)
⊥ = xq+10 ⋆ A(r+1)(q+1)−1(x0,x0) ⋆ Tr
(
GRSr(q+1)−1(x0,x0)
)
.
Since the alternant code is defined over Fq, it can get in the trace:
(41) C0(q + 1) ⋆ C0(0)
⊥ = xq+10 ⋆Tr
(
A(r+1)(q+1)−1(x0,x0) ⋆GRSr(q+1)−1(x0,x0)
)
.
By definition of alternant codes (Definition 2) and by duality for GRS codes (Proposition 4),
A(r+1)(q+1)−1(x0,x0) =GRSn−(r+1)(q+1)(x0,x
−1
0 ⋆ π
′
x0
−1
(x0)) ∩ Fn−1q
Therefore, since every code contains its subfield subcode,
(42)
A(r+1)(q+1)−1(x0,x0) ⋆GRSr(q+1)−1(x0,x0) ⊆
GRSn−(r+1)(q+1)(x0,x
−1
0 ⋆ π
′
x0
(x0)
−1) ⋆GRSr(q+1)−1(x0,x0).
Thus, from Proposition 12(i) on products on GRS codes, we get
(43) A(r+1)(q+1)−1(x0,x0) ⋆GRSr(q+1)−1(x0,x0) ⊆ GRS(n−1)−(q+2)(x0, π′x0(x0)−1).
Equations (41) and (43) yield
C0(q + 1) ⋆ C0(0)
⊥ ⊆ xq+10 ⋆ Tr
(
GRS(n−1)−(q+2)(x0, π
′
x0
(x0)
−1)
)
.
By dualizing and thanks to Lemma 31, to Delsarte Theorem (Theorem 2) and Proposition 4,
we get
D ⊇ x−(q+1)0 ⋆
(
RSq+2(x0) ∩ Fn−1q
)
.

Discussion on the equality. While Proposition 32 is only an inclusion, it turns out that in
all our experiments, the inclusion was an equality. It is worth nothing that the reason why
this equality typically holds is more or less the reason why our distinguisher works.
Indeed, for the equality to hold, (42) should be an equality. The right-hand product in
(42) is a GRS code of dimension (n − 1) − (q + 1) (see (43)), while the left hand one is a
product of codes of respective (designed) dimensions n−2(r+1)(q+1) and r(q+1)−1. From
Proposition 11, the product of two random codes with these dimensions would be
min{n− 1, (n − 2(r + 1)(q + 1))(r(q + 1)− 1)}
For cryptographic sizes of parameters, the above min is n − 1 and hence, with a very high
probability, the left-hand product in (42) fills in the right-hand one. This explains, why the
inclusion in Proposition 32 is almost always an equality.
Let us now investigate further the structure of the code RSq+2(x0) ∩ Fn−1q .
Notation 1. Let α be a primitive element of Fq2/Fq. In what follows we denote by E the
following code which is used repeatedly
E
def
= 〈1,Tr(x0),Tr(αx0), N(x0)〉Fq .
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Proposition 33. We have,
E ⊆ RSq+2(x0) ∩ Fn−1q ,
with equality when the support x is full.
Proof. We first prove the result under the assumption that x is full. Our goal is to describe
the polynomials h in Fq2 [x]<q+2 satisfying
∀x ∈ F×
q2
, h(x) = h(x)q.
Or equivalently,
(44) h ≡ hq mod (xq2−1 − 1).
Writing h as h(x) =
∑q+1
i=1 hix
i, Equation (44) yields the system
(45)


h0 = h
q
0
h1 = h
q
q
hq+1 = h
q
q+1
hi = 0, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , q − 1}.
Solving the above system yields the Fq–basis of solutions: 1, x + x
q, αx + αqxq, xq+1, which
concludes the proof. If x is non full then it is easy to see that the polynomials satisfying (45)
provide words of RSq+1(x0) ∩ Fn−1q but there might exist other ones. 
Discussion on the non full–support case. In all our experiments, the codeRSq+1(x0)∩Fnq
turned out to have dimension 4 even when the support is non full. This can be explained as
follows. In terms of polynomials, the full support code is generated as the image of the
Fq–space of polynomials in Fq2 [z]<q+2 solution to the Fq–linear system
(46) ∀xi ∈ F×q2 , f(xi)q − f(xi) = 0.
There are q2 − 1 equations, while the Fq–dimension of Fq2 [z]<q+2 is 2q + 4. The non full
support case is obtained by removing equations in (46). Since this system is overconstrained,
one can reasonably hope that removing some equations will have no incidence on the solution
space as soon as n > 2q + 4.
Conclusion. It is reasonable to hope — and this is exactly what happened in all our experi-
ments (more than 600 tests) — that
D = x
−(q+1)
0 ⋆
(
RSq+1(x0) ∩ Fn−1q
)
= x
−(q+1)
0 ⋆ E .
C.1.2. The full weight codewords of D . Since, the solution set of Problem (30) consists in full
weight vectors c with c1 = 1, it is sufficient to classify full weight vectors up to multipli-
cation by a scalar. For this reason, in what follows, we will frequently consider vectors up
to multiplication by a scalar. According to the previous discussions, one can assume that
D = x
−(q+1)
0 ⋆ E and the study of full weight codewords of D reduces to that of E .
Proposition 34. Let
U
def
=
{
(x0 − a)q+1
∣∣ a ∈ Fq2 \ {x1, . . . , xn−1}} .
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Then, the elements of U are full weight codewords of E . Moreover, let P be the probability
that every full weight codeword of E up to multiplication by a scalar is in U , then
P


= 1, if n > q2 − q + 2
>1− (q3 + q)
(q2−q+1
n−1
)
( q2
n−1
) , else.
Proof. Notice that the words (x0−a)q+1 for some a ∈ Fq2 are elements of E . Indeed, expanding
the word as
(x0 − a)q+1 = (x0 − a)q(x0 − a) = xq+10 −Tr(aqx0) + aq+1.
Since aq decomposes as a0+αa1, with a0, a1 ∈ Fq, this provides a decomposition of (x0−a)q+1
as an Fq–linear combination of the words 1,Tr(x0),Tr(αx0),x
q+1
0 .
Let us investigate further the structure of the elements of E . The codewords of E are given
by evaluation of polynomials of the form
(47) f(z) = λ1z
q+1 + λ2(z
q + z) + λ3(α
qzq + αz) + λ4, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4 ∈ Fq.
Therefore, describing the full weight codewords of E reduces to understand which of these
polynomials do not vanish at any entry of x0. Here, we can give a geometric interpretation
of the set of roots in Fq2 of such a polynomial in terms of points of affine conics over Fq. For
that we proceed to a Weil descent. Namely, set z = u+ αv, where u, v ∈ Fq. In addition, we
choose α ∈ Fq2 \ Fq so that
αq = −α, if 2 ∤ q or αq = α+ 1 if 2 | q.
Such an α always exists. Indeed,
• in odd characteristic, choose a non-square d ∈ Fq and let α ∈ Fq2 be a square root of
d.
• in even characteristic, choose d ∈ Fq such that TrFq/F2(d) 6= 0, then the polynomial
z2 + z + d is irreducible in Fq[z] and let α be one of its roots in Fq2 .
Let us treat the odd characteristic case, the even characteristic can be treated in a very
similar fashion. Set x = u+ αv, where α ∈ Fq2 is a square root of a non-square d ∈ Fq, then
a simple computation from (47) transforms f(x) as f˜(u, v)
(48) f˜(u, v) = λ1(u
2 − dv2) + 2λ2u+ 2dλ3v + λ4, where λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4 ∈ Fq.
The set of pairs (u, v) ∈ F2q at which f˜ vanish are in one-to-one correspondence with the set
of zeros in Fq2 of f . Therefore, f provides a full-weight codeword in E if and only if f does
not vanish on {x1, . . . , xn−1}, that is if and only if the zero locus of f˜ in F2q is contained in
A
def
=
{
(u, v)
∣∣ u+ αv ∈ Fq2 \ {x1, . . . , xn−1}} ·
Consequently, we need to understand the probability that A contains a conic whose equation
is of the form (48). Let us analyze some particular cases of conics of the form (48).
(i) When λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 0. The conic is empty. In terms of codewords, it corresponds to
multiples of the all-one word 1.
(ii) When, λ1 = 0 the conic is nothing but an affine line. It has exactly q points over Fq.
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(iii) For λ1 6= 0. Since we consider words only up to multiplication by a scalar, one can
assume that λ1 = 1. Let us look for a criterion for the conic to be singular. Recall that
a conic of equation f(x, y) is said to be singular if f, ∂f∂x and
∂f
∂y have a common zero.
The computation of the partial derivatives of f˜ yields:
∂f˜
∂u
= 2u+ 2λ2
∂f˜
∂v
= −2dv + 2dλ3
recall that we assumed λ1 = 1. Then f˜ is singular if and only if f˜(−λ2, λ3) = 0 which is
equivalent to
λ4 = λ
2
2 − dλ23 = (λ2 + αλ3)q+1
In such a situation a computation to f from f˜ yields
f(z) = zq+1 + λ2Tr(z) + λ3Tr(αz) + (λ2 + αλ3)
q+1
= (z − (λ2 + αλ3))q+1.
Therefore, the singular conics of the form (48) correspond to the words (x0 − a)q+1 for
a ∈ Fq2 . In terms of codewords, either a ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} and the word (x0 − a)q+1 has
weight n− 2, or it is an element of U .
(iv) Finally, for λ1 = 1 and λ4 6= λ22 + dλ23, the conic is nonsingular and it is well-known that
affine nonsingular conics have at least q−1 points (see for instance [LN97, Chapter 9.3]).
In summary, only cases (ii) and (iv) may provide codewords of full weight which are not in U .
The number of lines coming from (ii) is the number of lines in the affine plane, namely q2+ q.
On the other hand, the number of conics coming from (iv) is the number of possible triples
(λ2, λ3, λ4) with λ4 6= λ22 + dλ23. That is q3 − q2.
As a conclusion, there are q3+ q conics having at least q−1 points which may be contained
in A. The probability that such a conic is contained in A, which equals the probability that
the complement of A is contained in the complement of such a conic satisfies
Prob
(
A contains one of these q3 + q conics
)
0 if |A| < q − 1
6 (q3 + q)
(q
2−q+1
q2−|A| )
( q
2
q2−|A|
)
else.
Since |A| = q2 − (n− 1), this yields the result. 
q = 29, n = 791 q = 31, n = 892 q = 31, n = 851 q = 31, n = 813 q = 31, n = 795
3 10−34 2.3 10−33 4.7 10−26 1.06 10−21 4.7 10−20
Table 3. Estimates of the upper bound on 1 − P, where P is defined in
Proposition 34 for some explicit parameters.
Remark 9. Actually, a further study proves that the nonsingular conics considered in the proof
have all q + 1 points. This permits to obtain a sharper bound for the probability. Details are
left out here.
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C.1.3. Associating solutions by pairs. First remind that here again, words are considered only
up to a multiplication by a scalar. In the previous subsections, we proved that with a very
high probability, the inverses of the solutions of Problem (30) are
• xq+10 which is the solution we look for;
• the words xq+10 ⋆ (x0 − a)−(q+1), a ∈ Fq2 \ {x0, . . . , xn−1}.
In the very same manner, after computing the same filtration at position 1, one can then solve
a linear problem of the form of Problem (30) whose inverse full weight solutions are
• (x1 − 1)q+1 which is the one we look for;
• the words (x1 − 1)q+1 ⋆ (x1 − a)−(q+1) a ∈ Fq2 \ {x0, . . . , xn−1}.
Basically, we have two sets of q2 − n+ 1 vectors (one can exclude the all-one vector 1 which
is found easily). The first set contains xq+10 and the second one contains (x1 − 1)q+1. But
we do not know which ones they are. The first idea would be to iterate Steps 3 and 4 of the
attack until the attack succeeds which represents in the worst case (q2 − n + 1)2 iterations.
The point of this section is to explain how to reduce it to q2 − n + 1 iterations in the worst
case. For this purpose, let us bring in some notation.
Notation 2. Let x01 be the vector x punctured at positions 0, 1. For all a ∈ Fq2\{x0, . . . , xn−1},
set
u0(a)
def
= xq+101 ⋆ (x01 − a)−(q+1)
u1(a)
def
= (x01 − 1)q+1 ⋆ (x01 − a)−(q+1).
Moreover, set
u0(∞) def= xq+101 and u1(∞) def= (x01 − 1)q+1,
which can be regarded as u0(a) (resp. u1(a)) “when setting a =∞”. Finally, set
L0 def= {u0(a) | a ∈ (Fq2 ∪ {∞}) \ {x0, . . . , xn−1}}
L1 def= {u1(a) | a ∈ (Fq2 ∪ {∞}) \ {x0, . . . , xn−1}}
Lemma 35. Assume that n > 2q+4. Let a, b, c, d ∈ (Fq2 ∪ {∞}) \ {x0, . . . , xn−1}. Then, the
vectors u0(a) ⋆ u1(b) and u0(c) ⋆ u1(d) are collinear if and only if
either a = c and b = d
or a = d and b = c.
Proof. The “if” part is straightforward. Conversely, assume that u0(a)⋆u1(b) and u0(c)⋆u1(d)
are collinear. Thus, there exists a nonzero scalar λ ∈ Fq2 such that
(49) u0(a) ⋆ u1(b) = λu0(c) ⋆ u1(d).
For convenience, we assume that a, b, c and d are all distinct from ∞. The cases when some
of them equal ∞ are treated in the same way- we therefore omit to detail these cases here.
From (49), we have
∀i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1},
(
xi(xi − 1)
(xi − a)(xi − b)
)q+1
= λ
(
xi(xi − 1)
(xi − c)(xi − d)
)q+1
.
This leads to
(50) ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, (xi − c)q+1(xi − d)q+1 = λ(xi − a)q+1(xi − b)q+1,
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From (50), the polynomial P (z)
def
= ((z − c)(z − d))q+1 − λ((z − a)(z − b))q+1 vanishes at xi
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, and hence has n − 2 roots, while its degree is less than or equal
to 2q + 2. Thus, under the assumption n > 2q + 4, this polynomial has more roots than its
degree and hence is zero. This yields the result. 
Proposition 36. Assume that n > 2q+4 Let a, a′ ∈ (Fq2 ∪{∞})\{x0, . . . , xn−1}. If we have
the following equality of sets:
{u0(a) ⋆ c | c ∈ L1} = {c′ ⋆ u1(a′) | c′ ∈ L0},
where vectors are considered up to multiplication by a scalar, then, a = a′.
Proof. Clearly, if a = a′ then every element of the left hand set is of the form u0(a) ⋆ u1(b),
for some b ∈ (Fq2 ∪ {∞}) \ {x0, . . . , xn−1} and, from Lemma 35, this vector is collinear to
u0(b) ⋆ u1(a).
Now, if a 6= a′, then let b ∈ (Fq2 ∪ {∞}) \ {x0, . . . , xn−1} and b 6= a, a′. Then, Lemma 35
asserts that for all c ∈ (Fq2 ∪ {∞}) \ {0, . . . , n − 1}, u0(c) ⋆ u1(a′) is non collinear to u0(a) ⋆
u1(b). 
Proposition 36 allows to gather elements of L0,L1 by pairs (u0(a),u1(a)) without knowing
a. We proceed as follows: we compute all the sets
a0 ⋆ L1 def= {a0 ⋆ c | c ∈ L1}
for all a0 ∈ L0 and all the sets
L0 ⋆ a1 def= {c′ ⋆ a1 | c′ ∈ L0}.
for all a1 ∈ L1.
Then, if two such sets match i.e. if a0 ⋆ L1 = L0 ⋆ a1, then we create the pair (a0,a1). By
Proposition 36 they correspond to pairs of the form (u0(a),u1(a)).By this manner, we create
q2 − n+ 1 pairs of elements of L0 × L1. One of them is the one we look for, namely the pair
(xq+1, (x− 1)q+1).
C.2. Further details on Step 4 of the attack. Thanks to Lemma 23, one can compute
the minimal polynomial Pxi of every entry xi of x, that is to say that the support is known
up to Galois action.
Fact 2. From the very knowledge of these Pxi ’s, one can compute a (non unique) permutation
σ such that xσ
def
= σ(x) is of the form
(51) xσ = (u0, u1, . . . , uℓ1 , v0, v
q
0, . . . , vℓ2−1, v
q
ℓ2−1
, w0, . . . , wℓ3−1)
where
• the ui’s list all the entries of x lying in Fq;
• the vi’s list all the entries of x in Fq2 \ Fq and whose conjugate is also an entry of x.
• the wi’s list all the entries of x in Fq2 \ Fq and whose conjugate is not an entry of x.
Therefore, one can compute a generator matrix of the code C σ
def
= G
(
xσ, γq+1
)
by permut-
ing the columns of a generator matrix of C . Call Gσ ∈ Fk×nq this matrix. In other words Gσ
is obtaining by first picking the columns of a generator matrix G of C that correspond to the
entries of x that belong to Fq and then putting together the columns of G that correspond to
conjugate entries of x and finally put at the end the columns of G that are not of this kind.
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It is worth noting that, even when σ is computed, the vector xσ remains unknown since
only the minimal polynomials of its entries are known. Afterwards, we introduce an extended
support by inserting the conjugates of the wj’s.
(52) xσ
ext
def
= (u0, . . . , uℓ1−1, v0, v
q
0 . . . , vℓ2−1, v
q
ℓ2−1
, w0, w
q
0, . . . , wℓ3−1, w
q
ℓ3−1
).
This vector is also unknown, however, one can compute an arbitrary vector which equals xσ
ext
up to a very particular permutation. One can compute an arbitrary vector
(53) x′
ext
= (u0, . . . , uℓ1−1, v
′
0, (v
′
0)
q, . . . v′ℓ2−1, (v
′
ℓ2−1)
q, w′0, w
′
0
q
, . . . w′ℓ3−1, (w
′
ℓ3−1)
q)
such that for all i the i-th entry of x′
ext
has the same minimal polynomial as that of xσ
ext
.
Equivalently, the entries of x′
ext
equal those of xσ
ext
up to Galois action. This can be inter-
preted in terms of permutations using:
Definition 6. Let T be the subgroup of Sn+ℓ3 of products of transpositions with disjoint
supports, each one permuting either the positions vi, v
q
i the positions wi, w
q
i in x
σ
ext
. Every
element τ ∈ T is represented by the matrix
(54) Rτ
def
=
(
Iℓ1 (0)
(0) B
)
,
where B ∈M2(ℓ2+ℓ3)(Fq) is 2× 2 block–diagonal with blocks among
(
1 0
0 1
)
and
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
Lemma 37. There exists τ ∈ T such that τ(xσ
ext
) = x′
ext
.
We extend Gσ as a k × (n + ℓ3) matrix Gσext by inserting ℓ3 zero columns at positions in
one-to-one correspondence with the entries wqi in x
σ
ext
(see (52)). That is:
(55) Gσ =

g11 . . . g1n... ...
gk1 . . . gkn

 and Gσext =

g11 . . . g1s 0 g1,s+1 0 . . . g1n 0... ...
gk1 . . . gks 0 gk,s+1 0 . . . gkn 0

 ,
where s = ℓ1 + 2ℓ2 (see (51)). The corresponding code is referred to as C
σ
ext. The key of this
final step is the following statement.
Theorem 38. There exists a matrix M such that
(56) C σext M ⊆ Ar(q+1)(x′ext,1)
and M = RτD, where D is diagonal and invertible and Rτ is the permutation matrix of some
τ ∈ T as described in (54).
Proof. Recall that C σ = G
(
xσ, γq+1
)
. Since from Definition 3, Goppa codes are alternant
and hence from Proposition 9, the code C σ is a shortening of G
(
xσ
ext
, γq+1
)
. Consequently,
we have
(57) C σext ⊆ G
(
xσ
ext
, γq+1
)
.
Second, from Lemma 37, there exists τ ∈ T such that τ(xσ
ext
) = x′
ext
, then
(58) G
(
xσ
ext
, γq+1
)
Rτ = G
(
x′
ext
, γq+1
)
,
Next, from Theorem 14(iii), there exists a ∈ (F×q )n+ℓ3 such that
(59) G
(
x′
ext
, γq+1
)
= a ⋆ Ar(q+1)(x
′
ext
,1).
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Let D be the diagonal matrix whose diagonal equals a−1. From (57), (58) and (59), we get
(60) C σextRτD ⊆ Ar(q+1)(x′ext,1).

To finish the attack, we proceed as follows. We compute a permutation σ as in Fact 2.
Then, we compute the matrix Gσ
ext
defined in (55). Afterwards, we compute an arbitrary
vector x′
ext
and a parity–check matrix H of the code Ar(q+1)(x
′
ext
,1). Finally, we solve the
problem
Problem 2. Find the space of matrices M ∈Mn+ℓ3(Fq) of the form M =
(
E (0)
(0) F
)
, where
E is ℓ1× ℓ1 and diagonal and F is (2ℓ2+2ℓ3)× (2ℓ2+2ℓ3) and 2× 2–block–diagonal such that
H (Gσ
ext
M)T = 0.
The matrix M of Theorem 38 is a solution of Problem 2. Moreover, this problem is linear,
has ℓ1+2(ℓ2+ℓ3) 6 4n unknowns and (dimC )(n−dimAr(q+1)(x′ext,1)) > k(n−k) equations.
Thus, the number of unknowns is linear while the number of equations is quadratic. This
provides an extremely small space of solutions.
Example 1. If we consider a [841, 601] wild Goppa code over F32 (where r = 4), then we get
less than 3364 unknowns and more than 120200 equations.
Experimentally, we observe that the solution space has dimension 2 and an exhaustive
search of matrices which are the product of a diagonal matrix and a permutation matrix
provide two solutions (see Lemma 39 for the rationale behind these two solutions). Choose a
solution M, then factorize it as DRτ as in Theorem 38. This yields the permutation τ and
hence the support x. Second, the entries of D provide directly a vector a such that
(61) C = a ⋆ Ar(q+1)(x,1),
which allows to correct up to ⌊ r(q+1)2 ⌋ errors. Hence the scheme is broken.
The two solutions of the problem. The solutions of Problem 2 of the form DRτ , where
D is diagonal and invertible and Rτ is a permutation matrix has cardinality 2. This is due to
the fact that any alternant code of extension degree 2 has at least 2 pairs (x,y) to represent
it. This explained in the following lemma.
Lemma 39. Let a ∈ Fnq2 be a support and b ∈ Fnq2 be a multiplier. Then,
GRSk(a, b) ∩ Fnq = GRSk(aq, bq) ∩ Fnq .
Proof. Let f ∈ Fq2 [x]<k be a polynomial such that (b0f(a0), . . . , bn−1f(an−1)) ∈ GRSk(a, b)∩
Fnq . Writing f as f0 + f1x + · · · + fk−1xk−1, denote by f (q) ∈ Fq2 [x]<k the polynomial
f (q)
def
= f q0 + f
q
1x+ · · ·+ f qk−1xk−1. Then it is easy to check that for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, we
have
bqi f
(q)(aqi ) = (bif(ai))
q.
In addition, since by assumption bif(ai) ∈ Fq, we have
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, bqi f (q)(aqi ) = bif(ai)
Therefore,
(b0f(a0), . . . , bn−1f(an−1)) = (b
q
0f
(q)(aq0), . . . , bn−1f
(q)(aqn−1)) ∈GRSk(aq, bq) ∩ Fnq .
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm of the attack.
Compute C0(q + 1), C1(q + 1) using Algorithm 1.
L0 ← List of candidates for xq+10 (Obtained by solving (30))
L1 ← List of candidates for (x1 − 1)q+1
P ← the set of q2 − n+ 1 pairs (a0,a1) ∈ L0 × L1 as explained in §C.1.3.
M 0 ← 0
while M 0 = 0 and L0 6= ∅ do
(a0,a1)← a random pair in P.
P ← P \ {(a0,a1)}
Compute the minimal polynomials Pi of the positions using Lemma 23.
Construct Gσ
ext
, x′
ext
and a parity-check matrix H of the code Ar(q+1)(x
′
ext
,1) as de-
scribed in Theorem 38.
V ← Space of solutions M of Problem 2
if dimV > 0 and ∃M ∈ V of the form DRτ as in Theorem 38 then
M0 ←M
end if
end while
if M0 = 0 then
return “error”
else
Recover x and u from M as in (61)
return x,u
end if
We proved that GRSk(a, b) ∩ Fnq ⊆ GRSk(aq, bq) ∩ Fnq and the converse inclusion can be
proved by the very same manner. 
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